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11
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) Plaintiffs' Opposition to
) Motion to Dismiss First Cause

12

Dr. Allen Panzer,

13
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16
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Amy Sayers,

Plaintiffs,

) To Strike Class Action Allegations
) and supporting documents
)

21

vs.

)
)

22
23

Yelp, Inc.

Lily Jeung and
Darl"en Walchesky, on behalf of

tbemselves. and all others shnilarly) of Action and
situated,'

24~
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25

Defendant.

26

COMES NOW PLAINTIFFS in opposition to defendant Yelp, Inc.'s

27

Motion to Dismiss and Strike. This is a fact and law based, commonplace FLSA

28

action merely seeking fairness. This lawsuit is simply to get these plaintiffs their

29

wages;just as Yelp has paid wage::~ to all others for their labors and reviews.

30

31
32

Daniel A. Bernath
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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31

MEl\10RANDUlVI OF' LAW

32

INTRODUCTION

33

j

I'

Defendant Yelp, Inc. wraps itself in Old Glory and the First Amendment

34

but it is really something much more sinister. This is a simple case of an

35

ernployer/ capitalist, again not paying the wages of some of its employees.

36

The plaintiffs herein are all writers for Yelp, Inc. Yelp has paid all of its

37

writers one way or the other. Some of its writers it has paid properly in

38

wages for over 200,000 reviews. Other Yelp employees are paid in trinkets,

39

social advancenlent and a Jedi lwind Trick to get young people to work for

40

the rnere glory of participation in this new fangled ill.edium-the internet. It

41

is settled law that elnployers must pay their employees in wages and not

42

"all the ice cream you can eat" or other techniques contrary to the FLSA.

43

Employer can't get the empioyees to waive their wages, can't pay them in

44

glory of working for the movie/fashion/journalism business and can't pay

45

theln in shiny objects asthe settlers bought NIanhattan Island with $24 of

46

trinkets and beads. Yelp, Inc. actually has to follow the FLSA when it

47

comes to paying its workers; just like any other business in the country.

48

Yelp Inakes hundreds of millions of dollars off of its writers each year. They

49

have paid hundreds of thousands to some of Yelp's writers but have found

50

that for a certain class of status seeking people that they will enrich Yelp for

I

~
Ci.l

b.O

cO
0...
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51

mere pats on the back and trinkets. Indeed, Yelp has a history of using

52

these tricks to avoid its civil responsibility to pay wages and taxes. It was

53

sued and has just recently settled a lawsuit where other workers at Yelp

54

were not getting paid overtime. Yelp, Inc.'s defense again was they were

55

"volunteers" who in the end would get paid lTIOre in commissions by

56

working unpaid overtime. Yelp, Inc., eventually agreed to pay the overtime

57

owed, rather than face much higher penalties laid out by a jury.
58

®

.~

Yelp, likes to portray itself as a public service. But in fact at
least two judges have said it is the modern day "Mafia."
Judges have seen through Yelp!s unethical behavior and have
awarded damages and admonished Yelp! for misusing the

62

common law and violating citizens' rights. On April 26,

63

sworn testim.ony from a Yelp! s executive, Trial Judge Peter S. Doft in San

64

Diego California ruled that Yelp! uses brazen and audacious extortion

65

techniques against helpless small businesses. The Court also declared that

66

Yelp! tvvists the law to make it say the exact opposite of settled legal

67

principles and that Yelp! should pay punitive damages. The San Diego

68

Judge stated: "Yelp! is "is the modern-dayversiol1 of the mafia To

69

to me, I believe it might be a case for punitive damages, .... I'm just stunned

70

actually I mean, every single bit of settled law is twisted around by [Yelp! ].

2013,

after hearing

N(J)
b.O
ctI

0...
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71

Everything is twisted around." Oregon Circuit Court Judge Henry Kantor

72

has stated that Yelp is under investigation by the attorney general and that

73

Yelp, Inc., appears to act like "organized crime. "

74

Yelp has been accused nearly 500 times in filings before the Federal Trade
75

Comrnission of criminal extortion.

People will file "reviews" of businesses

••

on Yelp. Yelp will then take all the
positive reviews and hide them from

easy access of an IPhone as people look
for a restaurant or other business. Yelp,
81

Inc., "viII then take the scathing reviews (some written by Yelp, Inc.

82

elnployees-some several years old) and place them on the restaurants

83

review page, along "With a one or tvvo star. Businesses have closed because of

84

this Yelp, Inc., business practice. lVlerchant'slives have been threatened

85

after false reviews placed on Yelp.com. One business had its windows shot

86

out by gunfire and a brick three tinles and eventually closed because a fired

87

employee accused the beautician owner of wearing women's underwear

88

under his clothes and making a racial remark. Yelp's standard answer to

89

such pleas by the merchant is "we can fix that-send us money for

90

advertising." A search of google.com with the words "Yelp Extortion"

M
~~

ro

0...
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91

reveals: About 76,800 results (0.25 seconds) and "Yelp blackmail" About

92

80,400 results

93

subject of this lawsuit but is placed here to reply to Yelp's atte111pt to appear

94

as a Mother Teresa of the digital age.

95

(0.21

seconds). This bad conduct by Yelp is NOT the

The non wage paid writers of Yelp, Inc., that Yelp wants to cheat out of

their wages are the subject of this lawsuit.
97

The con1.plaint is NOT a Class Action governed by 12b

98

But is a Collective Action under the completely separate

99
100

I

A:n,d liberal requirell.nents of the Fair Labor Standards Act

Yelp, Inc. is cynically urging that this Court apply irrelevant statutes. The

101

requirements for § 216(b) collective actions are independent of, and

102

unrelated to the requirenlents for Rule 23 class certification. Wang v.

103

Chinese Daily News~ Inc. 623 F.3d '743, 761 (9th Cir.

104

weight of authority holds that Rule 23 procedures are inappropriate for the

105

prosecution ... under § 216(b)") "The requisite showing of similarly of claims

106

under the FLSA is considerably less stringent than the requisite

107

showing under Rule 23." (emph.added) Lewis v. Wells Pargo Co. 669

108

F.SUPP.2 nd 1124, 1127 (N.D.Cal. 2009) Courts have noted that Congress

109

clearly chose not to have Rule 23 standards apply. (While Congress could

2010)

"the clear

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE
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110

have imported the more stringent criteria for class certification under FRep

111

23, it has not done so in the FLSA) Thiessen v. GE Cap., 267 Fd 3d at 1105.

112

Looking to the standard for FLSA actions for pay for work done, a reading

113

of the complaint shows that the pleading standards have been n1et:

114

STREAMLINING WAGEA...l\fD HOUR MOTION PRACTICE

115

By George A. Hanson_American Bar Association'

116

http://tinyurtcom~67Vq

117

Wage and hour motion practice differs from run-of-the-mill federal

118

cases. The Opt-In Process; A Lenient Standard

119

True class actions require a "rigorous analysis" of the Rule 23(a)

120

prerequisiteS.l Plaintiffs "must be prepared to prove that there are in

121

fact sufficiently numerous parties, comrnon questions of law or fact,

122

etC./'2 as wen as show predorninance and superiority under Rule

123

23(b)(3). Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) cases are not true class

124

actiol1s,3 The court may send this notice after plaintiffs make a

125

1nodestfactual showing that they and potential opt-in plaintiffs

126

together were victirns of a common policy or plan that violated the

127

law. Notice the phrase "modest/actual showing." (in original)

128

This "question is quite distinct from the question whether plaintiffs

129

have satisfied the much higher threshold of demonstrating that
PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE
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130

commoquestions of law and fact will predominate' for Rule 23

131

purposes." While FLSA plaintiffs must offer more than '''unsupported

132

assertions,'" they face "a low standard of proof' at step one. A

133

lTlOtion brought under the FLSA "usually results in conditional

134

certification."

135

136

Though elnployees 1nust show plausible entitlernent to relief,

137

vVithin the con.text of wage and hour litigation, these motions (to

138

dismiss) frequently lack ill.erit and delay the proceedings while

139

unnecessarily consuming judicial resources. This should rarely be an

140

issue in FLSA cases. Employees generally do not have to rely on

141

inferences about ll.IDseen conduct. They need not offer

142

precise time records, and theirpieading allegations are

143

"accepted as tru~." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

144

The UDshot is sllllple: when an employee pleads that sh.e

145

worked 45 hours, but only got paid for 40, she has complied

146

with Rule 8's plausibility standard~. ("Unlike the complex

147

antitrust scheme at issue in Twombly that ... the requirements to state

148

a c1airn of a FLSA violation are quite straightforward.") Even when

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE
"

Case 2:13-cv-07805-DDP-JCG Document 39 Filed 01/23/14 Page 12 of 86 Page ID #:317

149

pleadings are less specific:. liberal anlendment rules mean that early

150

n10tions to dismiss 'will rarely advance the litigation.

151
152

PLAINTmffS CANNO'li WAMVE Tt1iE~RRIGH'rS UNDER. THE FSLA

153

AND ANY SO CALLED AGREEMENT

154

TO THE CON1'RARY IS UNENFORCEABLE

155

Plaintiffs boldly state, that plaintiffs were never hired or fired by Yelp
.9

156

Under the FLSA analysis, m.aster-servant anaiysis, California Labor Law

157

and Oregon Labor Law analysis and workers cOlnpensation analysis the

158

paid-in-trinkets plaintiffs were employees and entitled to be also paid in

159

wages. (See also Gatt v. Fox Searchli.ght~ infra) i\.ll of the factors that

160

defendant urges on the Court are not factors required in theses statutes and

161

case law. Defendants just made them up. Defendant also gives this court

162

documents that are not relevant to this demurrer. The so called "Terms of

163

Service" is not the TOS that existed when plaintiffs began working for

164

defendant and the "Elite TernlS of Service'~ was drafted by defendant just so

Il

165

this judge will read it for this Illotion and was created 4 years after plaintiffs

I
I
I

166

began working for defendant.

1

1

167
168

A tenant cannot waive their right to a clean and healthy because the .
landlord tacked a "Terms of Service" onto the inside of tenant's closet door

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE
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169

stating that she agrees to waive the Warranty of Habitability. A lawyer can't

170

have a client waive his right to sue the lawyer for malpractice by having the

171

lawyer slip in a TOS into his monthly bill. So too here; the writers who has

172

made Yelp, Inc.

173

under the FLSA.

a year cannot waive their rights to wages

174

"[Tlhe purposes of the ActJ'eguire that it be applied eve~ to

175

those 'Ivho would d(~cline its protectionso If an exception to the Act

176

w'ere carved out for elnployees willing to testify that they performed work

177

'voluntarily,' employers might be able to use superior bargaining power to

178

coerce employees to make such assertions) or to waive their protections

179

under the Act." Tony & Susan .AlwTLO Found. v. See'y of Labor, 471 U.S.

180

299,

181

j

$220,000,000

301

(1985).

Mischief such as Yelp presenting unconscionable waivers in docunlents

182

long after the relationship began should cause the Court to suspect that

183

nothing defendants do can be trusted. Even if the documents were

184

relevant, California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act explicitly prohibits

18S

"inserting an unconscionable provision in the contract.~' Cal. Civ. Code §

186

1770(a)(19). CAL.

j

1i
I,
I

187

eN. CODE § 1670.5: California Code - Section 1670.s(a)

(a)If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of

00

(j)

188

the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the
PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE
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189

court Inay refuse to enforce the contract, or it m.ay enforce the remainder of

190

the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so Ihnit the

191

application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable

192

result.

193

PLAINTIFFS HAVE SUFFICIENTLY PLED THAT

194

THEY WERE NON-WAGE PAID WRITERS OF YELP

195

AND TeiftS ACTION IS SO THEY MERELY BIE TREATED

196

Lnc:re THE WRITERS Of THE OVeR 200,,000 PAID REVIEWS

197

WRITTEN BY THE YELP WAGE-PAID WRITERS

199

The complaint clearly states that Plaintiffs were employees of Yelp, as were

200

aU other enlployees. Yelp paid SOIne in wages but paid plaintiffs in trinkets.

201

FLSA requires that all writers be paid in wages and not just the Yelp

202

Comlnunity Managers and the 200,000 other Yelp employees. The labors

203

of Plaintiffs have gained Yelp the $244,-000,000 annually that it garners.

204

It is exactly the SaIne w·ork that is done by the wage paid 200,000 revie·ws.

205

This has all be pled in the complaint and that is all that the FLSA requires:

206

To state a valid FLSA claim, plaintiffs had to allege (1) that they were

207

elnployed by Caritas; (2) that their work involved interstate activity; and (3)

PLAI~TIFFS'
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208

that they performed work for which they were under-compensated. 29

209

U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a)(1)

210

Pruell v. Caritas Christi 678 F.3d 10 (2012); (finding the first element

211

satisfied by rnere allegation that the plaintiff "was an employee" and "was

212

employed" by the defendant)

213
214

Haskins v. VIP Wireless Consulting 2009 WL 4639070, at *7 CW.D. Pa.

215

Dec. T, 2009) VIP contended that Haskins was ineligible from FLSA

216

provisions. However, whether a plaintiff is ineligible for FLSA protection is

217

mixed question of law and fact to be resolved by the court. This analysis

218

requires the court to review the historical or record facts and apply all

219

inferences drawn from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. Such a detailed,

220

fact-intensive analysis is impossible at the demurrer stage.

221

http.!lJtinyurl.comLp9gxst9. page 12

222

A

DIEMURRER/MOTMON TO STRIKE

223

IS NOT A PROPER 51"AGE Of "rHIE LITIGATION

224

To DETERMINE COMPLEX AND HIGHLY CONTROVERTED FACTUAL

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE
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226

"This analysis requires the court to review the historical or record facts and

227

apply all inferences drawn froni these facts in favor of th~ plaintiff. In

228

doing so, the court must narrowly construe the FLSA provisions against the

229

enlployer seeking to assert the exemptions." see Hein v. PNC Fin. Servs.

230

Group, Inc. 511 F.Sup.2d 563, 570 (E.D. Pa. 2007) and Morisky v. Pub. Srv

231

Elect. 111 F.SUpp,2d 493,499 (D. N.J-. 2000) Determine the exerrlpt or non

232

exempt status of any particular employee "is an extremely and individual

233

and fact-intensive" and requires "careful factual analysis of the full range of

234

the employee's job duties and responsibilities. ") see also Hein v. PNC Fin.

235

8ervs. Gr:p" Inc. , 511 F. Supp, 2d 563,570 (E.D. Pa. 2007) ("We conclude

236

that such a detailed, fact-intensive analysis is impossible at this stage of the

237

litigation."); Snyder v. Dietz & VtTatson, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 2d 428,451,452

238

52, CD.N.J. 2(11)

239

California Civil Jury Instructions (CACI)

2403706. Special Employment - General Employer and/or Specia.l Employer
241 Denies Responsibility
242

243

"In determining whether a special employment relationship exists, the

244

primary consideration is whether the special employer has I "[t]he right to

245

control and direct the activities of the alleged employee or the manner

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DISMISS .AND MOTION TO STRIKE
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246

and method in which the work is periormed, whether exercised or not. ..

247

.Ii

248

generally a question of fact to be resolved from the reasonable inferences

249

to be drawn from the circumstances shown:

250

(1979) 23 Cai.3d 168, 175 [151 CaLRptr. 671, 588 P.2d 811], citations

251

omitted.)

252
253
254

However, '[whether] the right to control existed or was exercised is

II

(Kowalski v. Shell Oil Co.

Contract terms are not conclusive evidence of the existence of the right to
control. (Kowalski, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 176.)
The existence of a special employment relationship may be supported by

255

evidence that (i) the alleged special employer paid wages to tile

256

employee, (2) the alleged special employer had the power to discharge the

257

employee, (3) the work performed by the employee was unskilled, (4) the

258

work tools were provided by the alleged special employer, (5) the work was

259

part of the alleged special employe(s regular business, (6) the employee

260

expressly or impliedly consented to a special employment relationship, (7)

261

the parties believed they were creating a special employment relationship,

262

and (8) the alleged special employment period was lengthy. (Kowalski,

263

supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 176-177.)

264

An employer that fails to adhere to the Act's record keeping requirements

265

cannot later cOlllplain that its employees' evidence of damages is inexact or
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266

imprecise. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946).
failed to keep accurate records and to credit all hours worked in violation of

268

the Employee Retirenlent Inco:me Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§

1059(a)(1), l104(a)(1) n this circunlstance, if (1) the evidence shows that the
270

employee performed work for which there was improper compensation,

271

and (2) the amount and the extent of work can reasonably be inferred, then
the wages owed to an employee should be awarded even if approximate. Id.

273

at 687-88.

274

The burden of proof shifts to the employer to produce evidence of the

275

precise a:mount of work the ernployee perfonned or evidence that negates

the just and reasonable inferences drawn frOlll the employee's evidence. Id
277

Elwell v. University Hospitals Hon1e Care Serv.) 276 F.3d 83 2 ,844 (6th
Cir.

2002),

the Sixth Circuit held that a district court should properly have

279

instructed a jury that evidence of recol'dkeeping violations can be an

280

element of recklessness or willfulness. A finding of willfulness would have
operated to extend the normal two-year statute of limitations to three years.

Id. at 842.
e
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286

Under an legal analysis

28 7

Yelp, Inc. also owes plaintiffs wages

288

.And not just trinkets, chocolate and a cult like membership
~

289

Again, plaintiffs have sufficient pled that they are elnployees of defendant

290

Yelp. that is all that is required by the FLSA and its very loose pleading

291

standard to defeat a demurrer. Zhong v, August Corp. 498 F. Supp. 2d

292

625, 628 (S.D,N.Y. 2007)

. 293

Even if more was required (it is not) plaintiffs are entitled to relief under

294

the FLSA and all other analyses. Under com.mon law, federal law, workers

295

compensation, wage and law and revenue la~vv, Yelp! is the employer of

296

plaintiff writers and has been reaping billions of dollars by (a) not paying

297

for their services as writers and (b) attelnpting to evade compensating

298

victiIns when Yelp! commits torts against helpless merchants. Yelp is a bad

299

corporate citizen. Taking from the systelTI and never paying back its fair

300

share. Yelp appears to have been cheating the taxing authorities across the

301

country by misc1assifying its labor force.

302

~~V analysis~Plaintiff\Vriters

303

Restatement of Agency

are employees of Yelp!
~
~
Q)

b.O
C\l

0..
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304

§ 1.02 Parties' Labeling And Popular Usage Not Controlling

305

Link to Case Citations

306

An agency relationship arises only when the elements stated in § 1.01 are

307

present. Whether a relationship is characterized as agency in an agreement

308

between parties or in the context of industry or popular usage is not

309

controlling.

310

REST :Jd ~GE~TCY § 1.02§ 1 •. 03 Manifestation

311

A person manifests assent or intention through written or spoken words or

312

other conduct.

313
314

fede~al

315

Yelp! admits that they are not paying "Yelpers" in wages or stock but in

316

merchandise, badges) accolades, "booze" food, swag andparties. The US

317

District Court Judge in the Southern District of New York declares:

Law Analysis, Plaintiff Writers are employees of Yelp!

318

" Rather than monetary compensation, the unpaid content providers

319

are offered exposure - nalnely, visibility, promotion, and

320

distribution, for thenlselves and their work~ ....

321

The unpaid submissions are arguably the website's most valuable

322

content, both because of their effect of "optimizing" the website's·
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323

ranking in search engines such as Google (thus attracting more

324

viewers to the website) and because they allow (website) to keep

325

production costs low.

326

From its inception, The {website} has generated revenue by, among

327

other things, selling advertising targeted towards visitors to the

328

website. Advertising revenues increase in proportion to the amount of

329

page views a website receives, which in turn is a function of the

330

quality of the content provided, as well as the website's ability to

331

attract visitors either through its o\,\'1.11narketing or via the social

332

networks of others.

333

Summary Judgment Order P.5 Tasini v. AOL, Inc., 11 eiv. 2472,

334

NYLJ 1202547682116, at *1 (SDNY, Decided)

335

336

Inter alia the Court stated that so called "unpaid" employees are paid in
non traditional methods "rather than lllonetary compensation". P. 5

337

338

The US District Court for the Southern District of New York in a carefully

339

reasoned case held that non wa~~aid workers for the movie companies

340

are clnployees of the movie compan)§ Eric Glatt, et ai., v. Fox

341

SearchUght Pictures, et aI.,

11

Civ 6784 (attached)
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342

Glatt and FootInan were unpaid interns who worked for the production

343

The Black Swan and 500 Days of Summer or in the office. The non wage

344

enlployees were paid in razzle dazzle from Tinsel Town, attendance at the

345

Wrap Party with the stars, prestige, exposure and resume enhancement-but

346

not in wages. The Court held that defendants were the elnployers of the

347

non wage paid laborers.

348

Was Searchlight the Employer of Glatt and Footman?

349

Plaintiffs and Defendants each move for summary judgment on the

350

issue of whether Searchlight was the "employer of Glatt and

351

Footman as that term is defined in the US Fair Labor Standards Act

352

(FLSA). .. The FLSA defines Hemplrut as lito suffer or permit to

353

work" 29 U.S.C. § of joint employers, and nail joint employers are

354

responsible, both individually and jointly, with all the applicable

355

provisions of the [FLSA]." 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a).

356

II[T]he lstriking breadth of the FLSA1s definition of 'employl 'stretches

357

the meaning of 'employee ' to cover some parties who might not

358

qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law

359

Qrinciple~.iI' Barfield v. N.V.C. Health

360

141 (2d Gir. 200B) (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503

9

ll

l

l

't

& Hosps. Corp.,537 F.3d 132,
f:'..
~

361

U.S. 318, 326 (1992)). iI[W]hether an employer-employee

Q)

b.O
n:l

0...
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362

relationship exists for purposes 9f the FLSA should be grounded

363

in 'economic reality rather than technical concepts. Birfield, 537

364

F.3d at141 (quoting Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366

365

U.S. 28, 33 (1961 )). "Employment" under the FLSA is lito be

366

determined on a case-by-ca.se basis by review of the totality of the

367

circumstances. I! Barl:ield, 537' F.3d at 141-42. "Above and beyond the

368

plain language, moreover, the remedial nature of the statute further

369

warrants an expansive interpretation of its provisions so that they

370

will have fithe "",dept po~sible imp-act in the national economy. III

371

Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 1'72 F.3c1132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999)

372

(quoting Carter V. Dutchess Cmty.Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir.

373

1984)). orWhen it comes to 'employer' status under the FLSA, control

374

is key. I! Lopez v.Acme Am. EnvtL CO' No. 12 Civ. 5'11(WHP), 2012

375

WL 6062501, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6,2012).

376

. A. Formal Control Test

377

1. Hiring and Firing Power

378

This factor focuses on the lithe power to hire and fire,1i not whetrler

379

that power was exercised. See Carter, 735 F.2d at 12 ... "

380

Searchlight's ability to hire managerial staff is enough to satisfy this

381

factor. See Herman, 1-'2 F.3d at 140

1I1

l

CO
M
Q.)
bJ)

ro

0..
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383

Searchlight's power to fire Black Swan production staff was unbridled.

384

Searchlight reserved the right, "in its sole reasonable discretion, to

38 5

II ••••

386

respect to [Black Swan].

II

dispense with the services of any person rendering services with

Functional Control Test

387

388

A district court must "jook beyond an entitls formal right to control
the physical performance of anotherEs work before declaring that the

390

entity is not an employer under the FLSA." Zheng, 355 F.3d at 69.

391

'I[AJn entity can be a jOint employer under the FLSA even when it

392

does not hire and fire its joint employees, directly dictate their hours,

393

or paythem." Zheng, 355 F.3d at 70. (p. 14)

394

1\10 single factor is controlling; the test "requires consideration of all

395

the circumstances. Archie v. Grand Cent. P'ship, 997 F. Supp. 504,

396

532 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); see also Wang, 2013 WL 1903787, at *4 ("[T]he

397

prevailing view is the totality of the circumstances test. ).p.25

398

6. Whether Searchlight and the Plaintiffs Understood They Were

399

Entitled to Wages

400

Glatt and Footman understood they would not be paid. But this factor

401

adds little, because the FLSA does not allow employees to waive

Ii

1I
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402

their entitlement to wages. ~T]he purposes of the Act require that it

403

be apgiied even to those who would decline its protections. If an

404

exception to the Act were carved out for employees wi11ing to testify

405

tilat they performed work Voluntarily, employers might be able to use

406

superior bargaining power to coerce employees to make such

407

assertions, or to waive their protections under the Act. Tony & Susan

408

Alamo Found. v. See'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 299, 301 (1985). This

409

protects more than the Plaintiffs themselves, because II[S ]uch

410

exceptions to coverage would ... exert a general downward pressure

411

on wages in competing businesses. II Tony & Susan Alamo Found.,

412

471 U.S.at302. It also protects businesses by preventing

413

anticompetitlve behavior. !IAn employer is not to be allowed to gain a

414

competitive advantage by reason of the fact that his employees are

415

more willing to waive [FLSA claims] than are those of his competitor.1I

416

Brooklyn Sav. Bank v.O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 710 (1945).

417

Considering the totality of the circumstances, Glatt and Footman

418

were classified improperly as unpaid [non wage paid] interns and

419

are lIemployees covered by the FLSA and NYLL. They worked as

420

paid employees work, providing an immediate advantage to their

421

employer ...

I

1I

ll
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442

her medical attention in a life threatening crisis; 54,57-reviewer told to

443

""rite two star reviews apparently so the victim restaurant would then be

444

willing to give Yelp money to have them removed, Yelp Community

445

Managers nationvvide, tasked to keep writers under control so they would

446

follow the rules. (As Yelp controlled the Community Managers and paid

447

them wages therefore they controlled the plaintiffs herein. (Searchlighfs

448

ability to hire managerial staff is enough to satisfy this factor. See

449

Herman 172 F.3d at 140)

t

j

450

1
1

451

Other false issues advanced by Yelp, IncG to distract the Court

452

Yelp gives a closing argunlent in its Motion to Strike. It gives no

453

authority for the law it pushes on this Court.

454

"Yelp has no power to hire and :fil"e~" says Yelp. Again, this is a closing

455

argument and contradicts the pled admissions by defendants in complaint.

456

"Yelp lacks supervision and control of plaintiffs" again, the facts

457

are pled in great d.etail in the Complaint and Yelp is simply making a

458

closing argument.

459

"Yelp's alleged control over employees" The facts have been pled in

460

great detail.

I

lI
I
I
I

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE

Case
2:13-cv-07805-DDP-JCG Document 39 Filed 01/23/14 Page 27 of 86 Page ID #:332
, .

462

"Yelp urges, encourages and educates users"

463

Here, Yelp bluntly lies to the Court. It states that Yelp did not supervise the

464

creation of content, posting of content, mandated creation of content, or

465

force plaintiffs to sublnit any content at all. This is all a bald face

466

Inisrepresentation by Yelp. Defendants contacted plaintiffs and demanded

467

that they write more and right more, right now. Complaint 16, 17, 18

468

Plaintiffs were "often directed to write more reviews if in

469

Defendant~s

470

previously discussed, Yelp told plaintiffs what to write, how to write it and

471

then fired them if they disobeyed the rules or continually threatened them

472

with such termination.

473

Yelp~s

474

that Yelp paid these plaintiff employees-just like Fox Searchlight paid its

475

unpaid laborers in prestige. Swag, parties and a flashy space on their

476

resume. Plaintiffs nlerely demand t.hat the FLSA be enforced and

477

defendants now pay thenl wages too.

478

Yelp's control through its Elite Squad Again, Yelp presents an "Elites

479

'f!.

opinion her production seenled to slack off," And, as

motivational a:wvards~ The awards were merely one other way

agreement" that they drafted for this litigation, for this judge and for this

M
N Q)
b.O

~e
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480

rnotion. Nobody has seen this "agreement" until Yelp was put on Notice

481

that the non wage paid employees were enforcing their rights under FLSA.

482

Yelp's "rate and methods9~-paying plaintiffs not in wage§ 4 years

483

after the employment relationship began. The "rate and method

484

test" that Yelp pushes on the Court do not exist.

485

Yelp's admission that Yelp did not ll'laintam records~ Actually,

486

each review written by each plaintiff has been recorded, each picture that

487

plaintiffs provided and which Yelp published has been recorded, each even

488

that plaintiffs conducted for Yelp has been recorded. In any case, the fact

489

that Yelp did. not keep employment records cuts against Yelp as an ethical

490

and law abiding business citizen. Employees generally do not have to

491

rely on inferences about unseen conduct. They need not offer

492

precise time recol"ds~ and theiI:.,n.leading allegations are

493

"accepted as true." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Anenlployer

494

that fails to adhere to the Act's record keeping requirements cannot later

495

complain that its employees' evidence of damages is inexact or imprecise.

496

Anderson v. l'vIt. Clelnens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946). failed to keep

497

accurate records and to credit all hours worked in violation of the Employee

498

Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ l059(a)(1),

499

llo4(a)(1) n this circumstance, if (1) the e'\iidence shows that the employee
PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DISMISS .l.-lliD MOTION TO STRIKE
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500

performed work for which there was improper compensation, and (2)

501

the amount and the extent of work can reasonably be inferred, then the

502

wages owed to an employee should be awarded even if approximate. Id. at

503

687-88. The burden of proof shifts to the employer to produce evidence of

504

the precise amount of work the employee performed or evidence that

505

negates the just and reasonable nferences drawn from the employee's

506

evidenc.e. Id In Elwell v. University Hospitals Home Care Serv., 276 F.3d

507

832, 844 (6th Cir. 2002), the Sixth Circuit held that a district court should

508

properly have instructed a jury that evidence of recordkeeping violations

509

can be an elen1ent of recklessness or willfulness. A finding of willfulness

510

would have operated to extend the normal two-year

511

statute of Ihnitations to three years. Id. at 842.

512
513
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514
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Daniel A. Bernath, attorney for plaintiffs
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
- ~ - ~ - - - - -. - - - - - ~ - .... - ~ - - ~ • - - - - - -X.
11 Civ. 6784 (Vv1-IP)

ERIC GLATT et al.,
l

MEMORANDUM &. 9RDER

Plaintiffs,
-against-

FOX SEARCHLIGHT PICTURES
INC., et ana.,.

Defendants

-" - ----.- --- ---.. ---- -- ----- -,. ---x.
Plaintiffs Eric Glatt, Alexander Footman, Kanene Gratts, and Eden AntaIik bring
this putative class action under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), New York Labor Law
("NYLL"); and California Unfair Competition Law ("CADCL") against Defendants Fox
Searchlight Pictures Inc. ("Searchlight") and Fox Enteltarr.ment Group, Inc. ("FEG"). Plaintiffs
contend that Searchlight a:..'1d FEG violated federal and state labor laws by classifying them as
unpaid interns instead of paid employees.
Glatt, Footman! and Gratts move for summary judgment that (1) they were .
"employees~'

covered by the FLSAand NYLL and (2) Search.light was their employer. Antalik

moves for class certification of her NYLL claims and conditi.onal certiftcation of a collective
action for her FLSA claims. Defendants move for summary judgment that (1) Gratts's claims
are time-barred; (2) Searchlight did not employ Glatt, Footman, or Gratts; (3) FEG did not
employ Antalik; and. (4) SearchIir,ht did not employ any of the production intems 011 five films

financed. by Searchlight For the following reasons, Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion is
granted in part and denied in part't Defendants' summary judgment motion is granted in part and
denied in part, and Antalik's motions for class certification of her NYLL claims and conditional
certification of an FLSA collective action ate granted.
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BACKGROUND
.
The Parties
Glatt md. Footman were unpaid interns who worked on production of the film
l1lack S~~ in New 'York. After production ended, Glatt took a second unpaid internship

relating to Blacl~"S\van's post-production. Grans was at.'1 unpaid intern who worked on
production oftbe film SQO Day,§ of Summer in California. Autalik was an unpaid intern at
Searchlight's corporate offices ill New York.
FEG is the parent corporation of approximately 800 subsidiaries, including co-

defendant Searchlight. Searchlight produces and distributes feature films. Searchlight does not
piOduce the films itself. Rather, it enters into Production-Distribution-Finance A!,rrecments
(UProduction Ab,rreements

H
)

with corporations created for the sole purpose of producing

particular films.

Black Swan began as a coHaboration bcnveen director Darren Aronofsky and
producer Scott Franklin. Aronofsky and Franklin incorporated Lake of Tears. In.c. for the
purpose ofptodtlcing Bla~k Swan. On November 2, 2009, Searchlight and Lake of Tears

entered into a Production Agreement for Bh.'lck S~!!.
500 Days of S,ummer was produced. by 500 DS Films) Inc.; a corporation created

solely to produce that film. Searchlight entered into a Production Agreement with 500 DS Films
for 500 Days (If SWll.t'ller. The Production Agreements for Black Swan and 500 Days of SlJ;..m.msrr

2
fII
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do not differ materially from one another. t They gave Searchlight the power to hire and fire
production persollnel. set budgets, and monitor the progress of films.
FEG~s

Internship Progran1
A11ta1';k claims she \;vas part of a "centralized unpaid internship prograrn!'! in which

unpaid interns at PEG's subsidiaries were subject to a sin.gle set of r"oHcies administered by a
small team ofintern recruiters. She maintains that two employees oversaw FEG's internship
program during the relevant periods and their responsibilities included soliciting "intern request
fomlS" from supervisors at subsidiaries intere.<)ted in hiring intems, approving those requests,

screening internship applicants, and processing interns' paperwork. According to Antalik. she
and the members of her proposed class and collective action were victims of a common policy of
using unpaid interns to perfoml work that required them to be paid.
Defenda.nts deny there was any "centralized" internship program. They argue
iIlternships varied considerably among vadous FEG subsidi.aries and departments, and

~nte'rns'

experiences were shaped by the particular supervisors tiley were matched with.
DISCUSSION:

SU111lTI.ary judgment

ehould be granted jf the record shows that "there is no

genuine dispute as to arty material fact and. the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. H Fed. R. Civ. p, 56(a); .§..ee alsQ Anderson v. Libertv Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242.247 (1986).

The burden of demonstrati.ng the absence of any genuine dispute as to a material fact rests with
the moving party. Se~: .Adickcs Y. S,11. Kre§s & Co., 398 U.s. 144, 157 (1970). Ouce the moving
I

May 10,2013 Tr. at 52;23-53:4.

3
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,

F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Equitable toIling is

appropriate when the plaintiff (1) filed a defective pleading that othenvise would have been
timely, (2) was unaware of her cause of action due to the misleading conduct of the defendant, or
(3) has a medical or mental condition preventing her from proceeding in a timely fashion.
ZeriUi~Edelglass,

333 FJd at 80. If one of those conditions applies, the plaintiff must show she

"(1) has acted with reasonable diligence during the time period she seeks to have tolled, and (2)

has proved that the circumstances are so extraorrul1aty frHlt the doctrine should apply.H Zerilli ..
Edelgl~,

333 F.3d at 80~81 (intemal quotation omitted).

~.

Gratts has 8. weaker claim to equitable tolling than her co-plaintiffs because she is

the only plaintiff who was aware of her pOtential wage claim nearly from the day it accrued.
Gratts testified that she understood she would earn minimum wage at her internship.23 After her

intemship, she left seve!".!l messages at the p.roduction office and even wont to the Fox Studios
lot to try to get her paycheck.24 Unlike an unpaid intom wh.o does not realize she may be entitled
to compensation, Gratts wa.."i aware of her claim since 2008 and did not act with reasonable
diligenc;J;) in the, time period she s{:eks to have tolled.

Gratts's CAUCL daim is time-barred because her internship ended before August
2008 and she is not entitled to equitable tolling.
III.

Was Sear@1ight the Employer of Glatt and Footman?

Plaintiffs and Defendants each move for summary judgment on the issue of
whether Searchlight was the "employer" of Glatt and Footman as that term is defined in the
FLSA and NYLL The FLSA defines "employ" as "to suffer or penni! to work." 29 U.S. C. §

---.-23

--

...•..

'.

GratIs Tr. at 66:12-19; 69:12~70:8; 149:19.25.

:4 Gratts Tr. 74:6-19; 185:6-i86;5.

8
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,

203(g), The law allows for the possibility ofjoint employers, and "aU joint employers are
responsible, both individually and jointly, with all the applicable provisions of the [FLSA]." 29
C,F.R § 791.2(a).

"[TJhc 'striking breadth' of the FLSA's definition of 'employ' 'stretches the
meaning of 'employee' to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict

application oftraditioml1 agency Jaw principles.'" iiflJfieldv. N':'~~C. Health & Hasps. Com·,
537 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotingN!!.tioTiwideMt!t. Ii'!$.. CO •. Yt Darden. 503 U.S. 318,
326 (1992)),

'~[W]hether an

employer-employee relationship exists for purposes of the FLSA

should be grounded in 'economic reality rather than technical concepts. m
141 (quoting Goldberg_v.

Wh.i.lakftIHqllse.Copp.~

~~rfield,

537 F.3d at

Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961)). "'Employment"

under the FLSA is "to be detem1ined on a case'·hy~case b.qsis by review of the totality of the
circumstances.'~

Barodd. 537 F.3d at

141~42.

"Above and beyond the plain language,

moreover, the remedial nature of the statute further wruTants an expansive interpretation of its
provisions so that they will have 'the widest possible impact in the national economy. m HCnrLat!
y;,. RSR Sec. SstIVS. L1;d~'i 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Carterv. Dutchess Cmty.
CoIL, 735 F.2d 8. 12 (2d Cir. 1984).

"¥lhen .1t comes to 'employer' status under the FLSA. control is key." Lopez v.
ACD1~Am.

Envtl. Co.~ No. 12 Civ. 51I(V;rHP}, 2012 WL 6062501 1 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6,

2012). The Second Cir<:uit has set out different tests to aid in determining whether an

employment relationship exists under the FLSA. Cart~ adopted a four~factor test to detemline
whether an alleged joint employer exercised "fonnal control" over an empl.oyee: "whether the
alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled
employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) detennined the rate and method of '
9

It
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payment, and (4) maintained employment records." 735 F.2d at 12 (quotingBonnette v, Cal.

J-lealth & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983»).
~hen,g. v. LihertL~J!rel

Co., 355 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2003) articulated another set

offactors for determining whether an alleged employer exercised <'functional control" over an
emp loyee even ifit lacked formal control: "(1) whether the (alleged employer's] premises and
equipment were used for the plaintiffs'

work~

(2) whether the [suhcontractors] had. a business

that could or did shift as a unit from Ottt} putative j oint employer to another; (3) the extent to
which plaintiff.') perfbmled a discrete iine~job that was integral to [the alleged employer)s]

process of production; (4) whether responsihility under the contracts could pass fi'om one
subcontractor to anOlhcr without material changes; (5) the degree to which the [alleged
employer] or [its] agents supervised plaintiffs' work; and (6) whether plaintiffs worked

exclusively or predominantly for the (aUeged ~~mployer}." 355 FJd at 72.
The NYLL's definitions are nearly identical to the FLSN s. See N.Y. Lab, Law §
2(7); see also Garcia v. La Revise Assocs. LLC, No. 08 eiv. 9356 (LTS) (TRK). 2011 WL
135009, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13,2011). Coth'iS use the same tests to determine joint

employment underhoth the l\TYLL and theFLSA Sec Paz v. Piedra~ No. 09 Civ. 03977 (LAK)
(GWG), 2012 WL 121103) at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.

12~

2012); f\-nsoumana v. Gristede·s Operating

CorP., 255 F. Supp. 2d 184, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
A. Formal Co.otro] Test

1. Hiring. and Firingyo~
This factor focuses on the "the power to hire and fire," not whether that power
was exercised. Se,e Carter, 735 F.2d at 12. The Black Swan Production Agreement required

Searchlight's approval to hire key production staff, including the department heads where Glatt
10

,
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and Footman intemed. 25 Though Searchlight did. not hire the lincproducers or department heads
on Black Swan. it oflf:n did on other films with similar Production Agrccments. 26 Searchlight's
ability to hire: managerial staff is enough to satisfy tflis factor. See HCITllan, 172 F.3d at '! 40
(Although Defendant's "hiring involved tnainly mana.gerial stan: the fact that [Defend.ant] hired
individuals 'who were in charge of the [Plaintiffs] is a strong indication of controL"); Torres v.
Gristede's Operating Com., No. 04 Civ. 3316 (PAC), 2011 WL 4571792, at *2 (3D.N.Y. Sept
23,2(11) ("There is 110 evidence that [Defendant] hired any class member. but there does not

have to be. It stands uncontradicted that he hired managt'!!iat employee-s.").
Searchlighfs power to fire Black Swan production staffwas unbridled.
Search1ig..~t reserved

the right, "in its sole reasonable discretion,!' to "require (Lake of Tears} to

dispense with the services of IDlY person rendering services with respect to [Black Swanj.'.27
Because; Searchlight acquired the power to firc, it is irrelevant that Glatt was offered his
intemship and Footman began his before Searchlight hecarn.e lnvo'!ved with mack Swan. GlatCs
supervisor told Glatt he needed "to clear with the Fox production executive for interns to be
working for free and geWrtg no college credits.~'28
Defendants argue that Searchlight had the right to fire employees "Quly if certain
conditions were met:,29 But Searchiight had. the right to require Lake of Tears to fire allY worker

25 Decl. of Rachel Bien in SUpp. of Pis.' Mot. For Partial Summ. J .• dated Feb. 15,2013, ("'Bien SJ Decl.") (Docket
Entry 1192). Ex:. 22 ("Production Agreement").
26 Dep. of Elizabeth Sayre dated Aug. 15,2012 ("Sayre 1'r.") 22:5-11; 53:5~55:12. The Caurtmay consider
evidence of Searchlight's control over the productions of films otherthan Bl®k Swan, because as Defendants
conceded, Searchlight's rights with resp~ct to the filnlS did llot diffennateria11y. May 10, 2013 Tr. at 52:23·53:4;

~Z also t~illl.1Jlj 172 F.3d at B9 ("Since economic reality is determined based upon all the circulnstances, any
relevant evl.dcl1cc may be examined so as to avoid having the test '::;on.fined to a narrow legalistic definition."
(emphasis in original»).
27

Production. Agreement (emphasis added).

~s Bien SJ Dec!. Ex. 14.
~9 Mem. of Law in Opp. to PIs.' Mot. for Pa."tial SUmll'l. J. ("Defs.· 8J Opp. Br.") (DocketEntry #118) at II.

11
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at Searchlight's "sole reasonable discretion.,,30 Regardless. ~f(cJontrol may be restricted~ or
exercised only occasionally~ without removing the employment relationship from the protections
of the FLSA, since such limitations on control do not diminish the significance of its existence."

IJern1ap, 172 F.3d at 139.

..

2. Sc;:archlight's ,.~bi1ity to Supervis_~or Control W-.iltk Sch.~dules or Con4ition~

Searchlight closely supervised work on BlaQk Swan. The production sent
Searchlight "crew lists" with the contact information for all staff, induding interns. 31
Searchlight required thc·m to send daily «call sheets t ' listing the scenes to be filmed the next day
and the work schedules for all personnet J2 The production also sent Searchlight daily "wrap
reports" listing scenes scheduled to be fUmed that day. scenes actually filmed l and the hours
worked by production employees. 33 Searchlight Executive Vice President Elizabeth Sayre

required production employees to call :he:r each morning to let her know what time filming began
and again each evening to let her know wh.at time shooting wrapped. 34 The production sent

SearchHght weekly schedules and cost reports detailing expenses. 35 It needed Searchlight's
pennission to incur cost overruns.3ft

Status as a joint employer "does not require continuous monitoring of employees,
looking over their shoulders at an times.~' aC!JJlal1, 172 F.3d at 139. fn Renllat!, the Second
Circuit afftmled the district co'Urt~ s finding that the defendant supervised and controlled

employee work schedules where he "kept himself apprised of [] operations by receiving periodic
__.H._. . ._. . _ . __. ____
30

Production Agreement

Sayre Tr. 78:1~79:1.
32 Sa.yre Tr. 46:21-48:10.

31

Sayre 'fr. 50:11-51:1, 81:15.·82:16,
Sayre Tr. 82:3-22 .
.15 Sayre 'fr. 125: 1.22; Production Agreement; Bien SJ Dec!. Ex. 6 Ex. B, Ex. 27 .
.i6 Sayre Tr. 177:22-179:5.
33
34

12
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reports from employees:' including phoning managerial employees '''reasonably frequently.')

Herman, ! 72 F.3d at 137.
3. Whethet:"oScarchlight Determjn..ed,Jhe Rate andMethod of Payment

Searchlight set the overa.ll budget for Black Swan and set the allocations for each
tine item. 37 Gla.tt and Fooi:rnan argue that through its control of tile bud.get, Searchlight 'Ide
facto" se;t wages for all production workers. J8 In B,uther::fonLFoQ..Q,Col'Q. v. M9Com~, 331 U.S.

722 (1947), the Supreme Court held that a slaughterhouse jointly employed meat de-boners even
though they were directly controlled by a bonin.g supervisor who contracted with the
slaughterhouse. In Zhel1g. the Second Circuit discl.lsse.d Rutherford and noted that '''the
slaughterhouse de factQ set the workers' wages, because the boners d~d no meat boning for any
other finll and shared equaJly in the funds paid to the boning supervisor." Zheng, 355 F.3d at 72.
Here, the crucial factor of equally sharing wages is absent. An increase in the wages budget
\vould not necessarily result in across the board raises; the production might have hired
additional workers or increased pay to particular employees.

But eVen though Lake of Tears hired Glatt, it needed Searchlight's pennission to
have an unpaid i.ntem who was not receiving college credit. 31} Moreover, Searchlight withheld
emptoyees' pay until tbey signed. Searclilight-approved employment agreements. 40 While
Searchlight may not have had the power to set employees' rate of pay, it was involved in their
method of pay. Cf. Herman, 172 F.3d at 140 ("little evidence" showed defendant determined

plaintiffs' rate of payment, "[bJut he did.participate in the method ofpaymenf').
.~1 Sayre TT. 17:11-18:12.
38

Mem.

(If IAl:'N

in Support of Pis.' Mot. For Partial Summ J. (''PIs.' 8J Bt'.") (Docket Entry #90) at 26 (citing

Zheng, 355 F.3d at 72).

Bien SJ Decl. Ex. 14.
,10 Sayre Tr, 75:24-76:11; Bien Ded. Ex. 19.

5"
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Searchlight required production staff to sign confidentiality agreements and
employment agreements known as "deal memos." Moreover, Searchlight insisted that Black
Swan employees sign revised deal memos it drafted even if they had signed memos before
Searchlight's involvemcllC 4 ! Searchlight did not aHow production employees to be paid until
they signed one ofSearchiight's deal memos.42 After shooting \'.'rapped, SearchHght required
Lake of Tears to send it the signed. memos. 43
Searchlight takes a narrow view, pointing out there is no evidence that Glatt,
Footman, or a..'1Y other unpaid intern signed a deal m(~mo.44 But the fact that Searchlight required
memos ftom the paid employees who. oversm;v the unpaid interns IS evidence of control over the
intems,
B. Functional Control Test

A district court must "look beyond an entity's fonnal right to r.ontrol the physical
performance of another's. work before d~,;clarii1g that the entity is not an employer under the
FLSA." Zheng, 355 F.3d at 69. "[A]n en.tity can be ajoint employer under the FLSA even when

it does not hire and fire its joint employees, directly dictate their hour.s, or pay them." Zheng,
355 F.3d at 70.

1. Whether Searchlight's Prcl11iS9S and Equipmentl¥m-e Used for Plaintiffs' Work
Glatt and :Footman's internships were based at Lake of Tears' offices; which it
leased before signing the Production Agreement with Searchlight.4~ There is n.o evidence either

Bien SJ Decl. Ex. 21; Sayre Tr. 172:9-74:4, I !5:8-23.
Sayre '1'r. 75:24.76:11;BiellDed. Ex. 19.
4313iellDed. Ex. 42.

41

41

44
4$

Def..;,' SJ Opp. Dr. at 17.
Dep. of Alexander Footman, dated May 7, 2012 ("Footman Tr.") at 198:2~4.
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Glatt or Footman ever visited Searchlight offices or ust--d its equipment The fact that Lake of
Tears' office space and equipment may have been renled or purchased in part by funds from
Searchlight does not transform them into SearchHght's premises or equipment.
2. Fftether Lak~9fTears Could Shift From One Putative Joint Ellw.loyer to Another
This factor is derived from ASJlthf!rford. where the plaintiff meat boners ·'had no

business organization that could or did shift as a unit from one slaughterhouse to a.l1other."
Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730. The Second Circuit observed this is relevant to joint employment
"because a subcontractor that seeks business from a variety of contractors is less likely to be part
of a subterfuge arrangement than a subc.ontractor that serves a single client." Zhong. 355 F.3d ~tt
72.

The Black Swan production could not shift from one film studio to a110Ll}er. The
Production Agreement prohibited Lake of Tears from taking Black Swan elsewhere unless
Searchlight aballdone.d the project or failed to advance funds. 46 It is irrelevant that the

Production Agreement did not prohibit Lake of Tears from workin.g on other projects. this
ignores economic reality in the film industry~ where a film is produced by a singlcwpurpose entity
whose operations cease after the film is made. 47
3. Extent to Which Plainti.f,'fs Perfonned a Discrete Line-Job That Was Integral to
Sear~h1ight' s Process of Production

In Rutherford. the meat boners' work was (';1 part of the integrated unit of

I
i

I
I

J

production" at the siaughterhouse. Rutherford. 331 U.S. at 729. "Interpr{'1ed broadly, this factor
could be said to be implicated in every subcontracting relationship, because aU subcontractors
perform a function that a general contractor deems 'integral' to a product or service." Zheng,

46

Production Agreement.
Tr. 16:5-14.

47 ~Frank:H!l

15
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program.,,52 Intern recruiters Aimee Hoffman and Laura Wiggins oversaw internships at various
FEG companies. 53 H.offman did not recru.it A11~alik. but when Fioffman became aware (If
Antalik's intemship, she required Antalik to submit paperwork to continue her internship. 54
Hoffman sent internship guidelines applicable to all FEG interns to Antalik's supervisor at
Searchlight.55 Hoffinan provided training to intern supervisors at PEG. 56 FEG exercised some

control over interns' schedules at its subsidiaries by requiring interns to work between 16 and 24
hours per week,. or 40 hours in the suw.r.net. 57 And PEG r:.:aintaiued emploY111ent records and a

personnel file for Antalik. 5&
This evidence raises factual disputes that preclude summary judgment in favor of
the Defendants.

Glatt and Footmar.:. move for summary judgment holding they were Hemployees"

covered by the FLSA and NYLL and do not fall under the Htrainee~j exception established by
Wll!ling v. Portlan4.Te[1l1inatCo., 330 U.S. 148 (1947).
In W',aUillg, a case involving a r.ailroad that held a week-long training course for

prospective brakemen, the Supreme Court determined that "trainees" were not covered
employeesund.er the FLSA. The trainees «[did] not displace any oithe regular employees, who

Dec!. of Rachel Bien in Opp. to Defs.· Mot. for Summ. J, dated Mar. 29, 2013 ("Bien 8J Opp. Dec!.") (Docket
Entry #140) Exs. 87, 99.
53 Dep. of Aimt'}e Hoffman., dated Aug. 16,201 Z(I<Hoftinan It.") at 265:2-268:22. Defendants emphasize Hoffman
was employed by fit'll( Group, New America Inc. and not by FEG. Decl. nf Aimee Hofflnan, dated Mar. 26,20 13 ~2
(Docket Entry #U8). However. this does not preclude the pos!libility she administered a centralized FEG internship
52

I

I
!

program. Her email si!,'llature lists her position as "FRO intern recruiter." Bien Class Cert. Ded. Ex. 22.

1
I
1

Bien SJ Opp. Decl. Ex:. 63.
Bien 8J Opp. Dec!. Ex. 95.
56 •
Blen SJ Opp. Decl. Ex. 86.
57 Bien SJ Opp. Decl. Exs. 65, 78.
58 Bien SJ Opp. Decl. Exs. 68, 69.
S4

S5
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[did] most of the work themselves, and must stand immediately by to supervise whatever the
trainees do." Walling, 330 U.S. at 149·50. The trainees; work "[did] not expedite the comp,my
business. but may, and sometimes [did}, actually impede and retard it." Walling, 330 U.S. at
15 O. The Court held that the FLSA "cannot be interpreted so as to make a person whose work
serves only his own interest an employee of another person who gi ves him aid and

instmction· ... the [FLSA] was not intended to penaliz.e [employer.s] for providing, free of
charge, the same kind of instruction [as a vocational school] at a place and in a manner which
would most. greatly benefit the trainee." )VaJHn~. 330 U.S. at 153, The Court concluded that

"[a]ccepting the unchallenged findings here that the railroads receive no 'immediate advantage'
from any work done by the trainees, we hold that they are not employees within the Act's

A Department of Labor fact sheet helps f.o dt::termine whether interns at for-profit
businesses faU within this exception. See U.S. Dep't of Labor Fact Sheet #71(Apri12010)
C'DOLIlltern Fact Sheet"). The Fact Sheet notes that "[t]he Supreme Court has held that the
term 'suffer or permit to work' cannot be inte11)reted so as to make a person whose work serves
only his or her own intc11~st an clnployec 0 f another who .provides aid or instruction, U It

enumerates six criteria for determining whether an intemship may be unpaid:
L The internship, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities of the
employer. is similar to training which would be given in an educational
environment;

J

2. The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern;
3. The intern does not dispJace regular er'apioyees. but works under close supervision

of existing staff;
4. The e1l1ployer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the

activities of the intern; and on occasion its operations may actually be impeded;

20
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5. The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the internship;
and
6. The employer and the intem understand that the intern. is not entitled to wages for

the time spent in the internship.
"This exclusion from the definition of emplo)'llli.'mt is necessarily quite nan-ow because the

FLSA) s definition of \employ' is very broad." DOL Intern Fact Sheet.
The Second Circuit has not addressed the "trainee" exception to the FLSA.
Defendants urge that the DOL fa.crors art": not the applicable ~:tandard and that this Court should
apply a "primary benefit test" by determining whether '''the intemship's benefits to the intern

outweigh the benefits to the engaging entity.••59
'While some Circuits have applied a ~'primary beneficiatyH test, it has little support
ill

Walling. The Supreme Court did 110t weigh the benefits to the trainees against those of the

railroad. but relied on findings that the training progra.m served only the trainees' interests and
that the employer received «no 'immediate advantage' from any work done by the trainees."
Walling. 330 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).

Thus, Wailing created a l'lan'Ow exception to an expansive defmition. "A broader
H

or more comprehensive coverage of employees ... would be difficult to frame. Unitecl Stptes v.

Rosenwasser 323 U.s. 360. 362 (1945). There is "no doubt as to the Congressional intention to
f

Defs,' 8J Opp. Br. at23. (citing SolifLi!:...1,gm:~lbroo1c Sanitarium & Sch.,I~) 642 F.3d 518,525 (6th Cir. 2011)
("[T)he ultimate inquiry in a leamulg or training situation is whether the em.ployee is the primary beneficiary of the
work performed."); BlairLVm~, 42(}F .3d 823, 829 (8th Crr. 2005) (finding students> chores at boarding schoo!

S9

were not work where they "were primarily for the stu<"~nts' ... benefit"); .~4£L~!:Hl}lHnJ:'. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207,
1209 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[TJhe general test llsed to deterrr..i.ne if an. ert\pIcyee is entitied to the protectio.ns of the Ad is
whether the employee or the employer is the primary beneficiary of the trainees' Jabor."»; see also Velez v.
Sanchez, 693 FJd 308, 330 (2d Cit. 2012) (in determining whether a plaintiff is a domestic service worker covered
by theFLSA, "[a) court shou.ld also consider who is the primary recipient of benefits from the relationShip").
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include aU employees within the scope of the Act unless specifically excluded." Courts should
be cautious in expanding the "trainee" exception established in Walling.
Moreover, a "primary bene£iciaryn test is subjective and unpredictable.
Defendants' counsel argued the very sarne internship position might be compensable as to one
intern, who took little from the. experience. and not compensable as t'? another, ',vho learned. a

10t.60 Under this test, an employer could. never know in advance whet...lter it would be required to

pay its interns. Such a standard is unmanageable.

By contrast., the DOL factors have support in WaIHl;!g. Because they were
promulgated by the agency charged with admm.istering the FLSA and are a reasonable
application ofit, they are entitled to deference.6t .wang v. Hearst Corp., --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2013

WL 1903787, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2013) (citing!Init~,States v. Mead C,orp., 533 U,S. 218,
234 (2001»). No single factor is controlling; the test "'requires consideration of aU the
circumstances." Archie v. Gra.'ld Cent P'shiP., 997 F. Supp. 504, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); see also

Wang, 2013 WL 1903787. at *4 C"[T]he prevailing view is the totality of the circumstances
test."}.

As noted above~ "since the NY LV s definition of employment is nearly identical
to the FLSA's[,.1 courts in this circuit have held that the New York Labor Law embodies the
same standard for employment as the FLSA."

I
I

-1

I
!

1

II
I

I
~

~ano

v. DPNY. Inc~, 287 F.R.D. 251, 260 n.2

(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal quotation and alterations omitted} The analysis for the trainee
May 10, 20 t3 11'. 42:23-43:8.
61 Defendants argue the DOL fa(;tors do not deserve deference because DOL opinion letters, which do not stem from
"formal agency adjudication or noti'ce-and-comTncntrulema'king, are not binding authority." Def..'l.' SJ Opp. Br. at
25 n.14. (q:uoti.ng j3arfield, '537 F.3d at 149). But even if not bindiog~ "such ag{~ncy kltters represent 'a body of
experience ",nd informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort far guidance, '" Barfield, 537
F.3d at 149 (quoting Q.!,!,gJ.?p.4.Ly, AdalM, 385 F.3d 2:~, 243 (2d Cir. 200-t)). inc DOL Intern Fact Sheet was issued
it12010, but the same six factors "have appeared in Wage and Hour Administralor opinions since at least 1967."
Reich v. Parker Fire Prot Dist., 992 F.2d 1023,1027 (IOthCir. 1993).

60
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showing' that they and potential opt~in plaintiffs 'together were victims of a common policy or

plan that violated the law.'" Mvers, 624 F.3d at 555 (quoting Hoffmanll v. Shatto, Inc., 982 F.
Supp. 249,261 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
Courts apply "heightened scrutiny" to motions for court-authorized notice made

after discovery.

TOlT~.§~

2006WL 2.819730, at *9. For post-discovery motions, (;ourts consider

whether the plaintiff and proposed dass m.embers are "similarly situated" by considering "0)
disparate factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) the various defenses
available to defendant which appear to be individual to each plaintiff; and (3) fairness and
procedural considerations." Ton'es, 2006 WI.. 2819730, at *9 (internal alteration omitted)

(quoting Thie,ssen v. Gen. ,Elec. CgtI?ital Q~i 267 F.3d

1095~

1102 (10th Cir. 2001».

Antalik moves for authorization to send notice of this action to
all individuals who had unpaid internships bct\veen September 28. 2008 and
September 1,2010 with one ormOfe of the foHowing divisions ofFEG: Fox

Filmed Entertainment, Fox Group, Fox Netvvorks Gro'UPt and Fox Interactive
Media (rcnanflcd News Corp, Digital Media).
As discussed above~ Amalik has put forth generalized proofthat interns were victims ofa

common policy to replace paid workers with unpaid interns. Though there are disparate factual
and employment settings. the common issues ofliabiHty predominate over individual issues and
defenses. See Torres, 2006 \VL 2819730, at '):10. And the same fairness and procedural
1

j

considerations that make a class action a superior mechanism for th.e NYLL claims make a

1

i

collective action a superior mechanism for the FLSA claims.

1

J

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment that
Gratts's CADCL claim is time~barred is granted, and the remainder of its summary judgment
35
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motion is denied. Glatt and Footman's motion for summary judgment that they are "employees"
covered by the FLSAa.1ld NYLL and that Searchlight is their joint employer is granted. Gratts's
motion for summary judgment is denied. Antalik's motions for class certification of her NYLL

claims and conditional certification of an FLSA collective action are granted and the Jaw finn of
Outten & Golden LLP is appointed as class counsel. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate
the motions pending at ECF Nos. 89, 93, and 103.
Dated: June J 1. 2013
New York, New York

SO ORDERED:

'~~~
V.S.DJ.
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Adam T. Klein, Esq.
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J eill1ifer 1. Liu, Esq.
JUDO E. Turner, Esq.
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Yelp! Terms of Service October 15, 2004
By using the Yeip! Services (as defined below) which are owned and operated by
Yelp! Inc. ("Yelp!ll) and by accessing the Yelp! Site located
at http://www.yelp.com. and all linked pages owned and operated by Yelp! (the
"Yelp! Site"), you agree to be bound by these Terms of Service (this
"Agreement") .
Yelp!'s on-line services which are available at the Yelp! Site will, among other
things, help you find businesses/services you are looking for by allowing you to
get recommendations from your friends, post and share these recommendations
with your friends, and view third party postil1gs/recommendations regarding
similar businesses/services ("Yelp! Service"), This Agreement sets out the legally
binding terms with respect to your use of and our provision of the Yelp! Site and
Yelp! Services.

1. Eligibilitv_ You must be 18 or over to register as a member of Yelp! or use
the Yelp! Site and Yelp! Services. Membership in the Yelp! Service is void
where prohibited by applicable law, and the right to access the Yelp! Site is
revoked in such jurisdictions. By using the Yelp! Site and/or Yelp! Services,
you represent and warrant that you have the right, authority, and capacity
to enter into this Agreement and to abide by all of the terms and conditions
of this Agreement.

2. Changes to the Agreement or the Yelp! Services. You agree and
understand that this Agreement, the Yelp! Site and the Yelp! Services may
be modified by Yelp! at any time without prior notice, and such
modifications will be effective upon Yelp!'s posting of the new terms and/or
upon implementation of the new changes on the Yelp! Site.
3. Registration and Security. You may be required to register with Yelp! in
certain circumstances and to select a password and user name, which shall
consist of an email address you own and use ("User ID
If you register
you agree to provide Yelp! with accurate, complete, and updated
registration information. Failure to do so shall constltute a breach of this
Agreement, which may result in immediate termination of your account.
You may not: (i) enter, select or use a false name or an email address
owned or controlled by another person with the intent to impersonate that
person; or, (ii) use as a User ID a name subject to any rights of a person
other than yourself without appropriate authorization. Yelp! reserves the
right to refuse registration of, or cancel a User ID in its discretion. You shall
be responsible for maintaining the confidentiality of your password,
Il

).

I

-1

4. Use of the Sate/Services by Members. You may use the Yelp! Site to
solicit recommendations from, and share recommendations with, your
1
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3
4

DANIEL A. BERNATH, SBN 116636
ussyorktowncvs10@yahoo.com
10335 sw Hoodview Drive
Tigard OR 97224

5

503.36742 04

1

2

FILED
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

.,12014
CENTRAL DISTAICT OF CALIFORNIA
BY
DEPUTY

6

7.
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

CEl\TTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11

- __ 12

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Dr. Allen Panzer,
) CV13-070805-DDP-J'CG
A:my Sayers,
)
Lily J eung and
) Plaintiffs' Opposition to
Darren Walchesky, on 'behalf of
) Special Motion to Strike
. themselves and all others similarly) Complaint demanding wages
situated,
) pursuant to Fair Labor Standards
'. ) Act, and contract based cause of
Plaintiffs, _~=~rni'l'1ill'YfFii"EoI ). action Quantum MeMlit, Request/o.,.
} plaintiffs' attorney fees
)

) Febuary 10, 2014

VS.

21

22

.

Yelp, In

23

\) 1.0:00 a.ifi.

Dlsr-'-'" OF·(;Aqr-.<:i"'~!', ~.)

L2J.._------l

.. ::.:.:.'

'!

)

Courtroom 3; 2 nd Floor
Hon. Judge Dean D. Pregerson

)

24

Defend

25

COMES NOW PLAINTIFFS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION

26

TO STRIKE CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION QUANTUM MERUIT based

27

on their intentional misreading of the anti SLAPP statute. Request for

28

attorney fees. This lawsuit has nothing to do with "Speech" but is routine FLSA

29

action to get these plaintiffs their wages~

31

Daniel A. Bernath, Esq. January 10, 2014

32
PLAiNT~FfS OI?POSITION TO fRHVOLOUS $PECI.AL MOTION TO STRIKE

(OPPOSITION TO ANTH-SLAPP MOTION)

o

•
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Memoranduul of Points and Authorities ... 1

Plaintiffs submitted their content with a reasonable expectation of

compensation ... 4
Defendant Yelp! was sued for Breach of Contract Type causes of action And
not Defalnation as such, the anti-SLAPP statutes Do not apply ... 5

The 9th Circuit repeatedly recognizes A cause of action for unjust
enrichment ... 15

Tasini v. AOL 851 F.SUPP2d 734 Is not a Fair Labor Standards Wage Case
But investors who allegedly paid their share in product demanded a
percentage ovvnership of Huffington Post .... 16·

Plaintiffs are all vvriters for Yelp A.l1d unlike Wal-Malt v Dukes Do not have
separate supervisors At separate stores who have discriminated In separate
ways ... 17

Yelp's at times cult like control of plaintiffs through social prestige, casual
sex, hetro, homo, perverted, free liquor and demands of more labor from
plaintiffs. .. .. 19

California's anti SLAPP statute Procedural and not substantive ... 25
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Barnes v. Yahoo ... 4.. 11

Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gard"er, Inc.,
First Nationwide Savings v. Perry

11

820 F.2d

973, 977 ...15

Cal.ApP.4th 1657 ...15

Creely v. HeR ManorCare ...17
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight ... 4
GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 662 ...13

Larkin v.

Ye~p

... 2, 3

Larkin, Settlement Motion, page 3, Lines 7-9 Attached) ...3
Makaeffv. Trulnp, Univ. (11-55016 9th Cir 2013) ...25
1VIontez v. Pilgrirn Films & Television 08-56954 9th Cir.

2011 ...15

OrBrien V. Ed Donnelly Enters., 575 F.3d at 584....18
Ochs V. PacifiCare of California (2004) 115 CalApP.4th 782 ... 6
Sliger et al. v. Prospect Mortgage, LLC et al. ...18

Tasini v. AOL 851 F.Supp 2d 734 ...15
Wal-MartvDukes ...17
Utility A.udit Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2008

...1.1

Case 2:13-cv-07805-DDP-JCG Document 39 Filed 01/23/14 Page 51 of 86 Page ID #:356

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

33

Once again, Yelp is twisting settled law in the hopes that nobody will

34

I

35

notice. 1 Yelp is again sued in a run-of-the ruiU FLSA action with a pendent

36

state court equity cause of action for contract/quantum meruit. Yelp twists

37

this to say that 1u Yelp is on the internet,

38

2.

Plaintiffs have posted their labors For Yelp on the internet,

39

2 ..

Therefore, Yelp has i.rnm.unity from an FLS.A.lawsuit.

40

Under Yelp's continual "twisted" legal reasoning flu, a Yelp CEO could

41

spill his yogurt in the lobby and Yelp would be inlmune from a personal

42

injury !av\Tsuit if the victinl also posted on Yelp. If Yelp stops paying its San

43

Francisco landlord, Yelp believes that an anti SLAPP motion should get that

44

contract cause of action dismissed. Yelp has just hit on this "twisty"

45

strategy however, Earlier, when Yelp laborers in the sales department were

46

not paid overtime and sued Yelp, Yelp didn't have the audacity to bring an

47

anti SLAPP motion. Larkin v. Yelp (attached) Yelp was sued by laborers

48

who they named "account executive trainee, junior a.c~, account executive

49

and senior account executive.

i
On-April 26, 2013, after hearing sworn testhnony from a Yelp! s executive,
Trial Ju.dge Peter S. Doft in San Diego California declared that Yelp! twists
the law to make it say the exact opposite of settled legal principles .... I'm just
stunned actually I mean, every single bit of settled law is twisted around by
[Yelp! J. Everything is twisted around.~'
1

PLAINTIFFS OIPPOSITION TO FRIVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
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50

This is the same thing Yelp has done with its writers-calling

51

some "Community Managers", "employees", "Scouts", "Elites",

52

etc. but all doing the exact sanle labors for Yelp with some people

53

paid wages and plaintiffs herein, not being paid wages. Plaintiffs herein

54

provided reviews to attract an audience for defendant Yelp, said audience

55

used as the basis for the salesman to make sales contracts with advertisers.

56

Yelp's defenses to the Larkin FLSA action was not a frivolous anti SLAPP

57

motion but ~'plaintiffs, have signed releases that prevent them

58

from bringing" an FSIA lawsuit. Larkin, Settlement l\iotion, page 3,

59

Lines 7-9 Attached) Yelp finally paid $1,250,000 to the unpaid salesmen as

60

part of the settlenlent in that FLSA action.

61

Yelp trots out the same frivolous defenses that laborers "agreed" to work

62

for free and can't sue Yelp under the provisions of The Fair Labor

63

Standards Act. Larkin Settlement I\-iotion. Rather than repeat the P and

64

A's that hold Yelp's defense is frivolous, Plaintiffs invite the Court to look

65

the Opposition to Strike where the lav,r is clear that a laborer cannot waive

66

his or her rights under the FSLA. The T08 that Yelp produces, especially

67

the so called Elite TOS were drafted by Yelp well after the emplo)'lnent

68

relationship began (Indeed, the Elite 1'08 was drafted by defendant

69

specifically to have this judge read it in this ITiOtion).

N.
Q)

b.O
CiS"
P-.
..

PLAINT!FIFS OPPOSITION TO fRDVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE

(OpPOS&TmON TO ANTD-SlAPP MOTION)
~.; . ;";;ri:

..
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,0..

70

PLAINTIFFS SUBMITTED THEIR CONTENT WITH A REASONABLE

71

IEXPECTATMON OF C:OMPIENSATION

72

Yelp paid Community Managers, Scouts and paid for well over 200,000

73

reviews; Yelp adn1its all these laborers were paid in wages. Plaintiffs have

74

repeatedly pled that they were paid, as were the Glatt v. Fox Searchlight

75

plaintiffs, but as yet, not in FLSA required wages and not wages as Yelp has

76

paid its hundreds of thousands of other writers [So ll1any reviewers were

77

paid that Yelp admits to the SEC and FTC that it is beyond their ability to

78

count. SEC filing byYelpJ. Complaint 6,9,10, 11, 12, Defendant again

79

deceives this Court by falsely stating that at Compo 15-18 "used Yelp for

80

social nernTorking." Plaintiffs say no such thing. Yelp is saying that because

81

plaintiffs liked their job as \vr'iters that they should not be paid. Again,

82

and of course, Yelp again gives no authority for such a proposition.

83

This motion is 100% frivolous and and/or for the purpose of delay and

84

plaintiffs should be reimbursed for their attorney fees to oppose it and to

85

send Yelp the judicial equivalent of an email-such nonsense will not be

86

tolerated in our Courts.

87

",

11
-;.

The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has emphatically stated that contract type

88

causes of action cannot be reached by the anti SLAPP motion and there is

89

no immunity for contract causes of action under the CDA. Barnes v.
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO fRiVOLOUS $PECDAL MOTION TO STRiKE
(OPPOSITION TO ANTI-SLAPP MOTION)

,~.

"
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90

Yahoo, infra. Yelp has repeatedly been given this 9th eire Case in Bernath v.

91

Yelp in Oregon Circuit Court and in a letter to meet and confer requesting

92

that Yelp withdraw their frivolous Special Motion to Strike. (attached)

93
94

DEFENDANT YELP! WAS SUED FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT

95

TYPE CAUSES Of ACTION

96

A.ND NOT DEFAMATION

97

AS SUCHI' THe ANTI-SLAPP ·STATUTES

98

Do NOT APPILY

99

Defendant's motion is a disgrace, subn1itted by a new admittee to the

100

California Bar, Shanti Michaels #277552 and a boiler plate motion that

101

the so called CALIFORNIA ANTI SLAPP PROJECT has used again and

102

again and again to burden the Courts and plaintiffs. Yelp demands this

103

Court stretch this law; like a lower lip pulled over the Court's head. Yelp

104

opinies that as PLAINTIFFS spoke on a public forum that the FLSA

105

complaint must be disDlissed pursuant to the anti SLAPP statute. Yelp

106

says that not paying wages is "conduct in furtherance ofllie

107

exercise oftheuoconstitutional right offree speech." sic Motion

108

p.ll, L10-12.

109

routine FSLA action into a mislabeled crusade to save "Free Speech. ')

That is gibberish and this Court should not turn a

PLAINTIFfS OPPOSITBON TO FRIVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
(OPPOSRTION TO ANTI-SLAPP MOTBON)
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110

111

a Quantum meruit theory, a plaintiff must establish both that he or

112

she was acting pursuant to either an express or implied request for

113

services from the defendant and that the services rendered were

114

intended to and did::....!b:.,:e=.n,,-,=e:..:..,:fi-=-.t·~th:.;::;e_ defendantJ5 (Ochs v. PacifiCare of

115

California (2004) i 15 Cal.App.4th 782, 794 [9 Cal.Rptr.3d 734], internal

116

citation omitted.)

117

1

j

"To recover on a clanm 'for the reasonable value of services under

Plaintiffs have clearly pled the elements of quantum merit. There was an

118

express request for services from the defendant. Conlplaint para. 16, line

119

25, and on P.4, line 1; para. 17, Line 17-18; para. 18, Lines 4-5.

120

services were requested and "did benefit the defendant." Cropt para. 76.

121

Yelp demands that plaintiff use its tools, wv.r.v.yelp.coll1 server and

122

computer program, wear its logo on clothes, vvrist bands, hand out Yelp

123

stickers, represent that they were enlployees of Yelp, Inc., follow its many

124

rules or suffer "serious penalties" Com.plaint Para.52 1-25 and to wear Yelp

12 5

gear to identify them as Yelp enlployees and/or laborers, entiiJing plaintiffs

126

to wages, over and above the trinkets, bling and Yelp "undies".

The

I

I
I

II
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION! TO fRIVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTSON TO STRIKE
(OPPOSITION TO ANTI-SLAPP MOTION)
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127
128

Yelpadnlissions on its website W\J\1w.Vclp.COlTI Yelprs logo is proudly

129

called a 'Yelp!GASM". Demanding more labor, Yelp! instructs its

130

writers, "Sounds like you need to get to writing some reviews

131

there cowboy." (see decl of Bernath)
~1 for our Elite Events.

I Velp SaM Ff'B1ICisco Shirt

1

255 printed

Where do you Yelp? You Yelp San
Franciseo, don't you? e'mon.· Sure
you do. SF is whare we ~1arted and
c~ntinue to go strong. This si1.irt was
pn~ted in a iimited run for our Frl5t big
nol/day party. Oh my gosh, Y9U
w~ren't there? It was MIl' like ttlfl
coolest freaking party 011 the planet.
You're so lame.

i
i

I

f

Star Shirt .'.' ,
You rem€'mbe-r thiS shlf17 Dudt' H'l$
132

;.rlll' ";' uld "d~::wl Th!·... w:,S the hr;.;~

PlLAlNTlfFS OPPOSITION TO FRIVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
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,
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133

Requests by defendant to provide more services and attend its business meetings

134

and wear and identify as defendant's agents and/or employees. Business meeting

135

with free liquor" •••for our first big holiday party. Oh my gosh, you

136

weren't there? It was like the coolest freaking party on the planet.

137

You're so lame.'~

II
I

II

I

I'

PLAINTiFFS OPPOSITION TO FR.iVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
(OPPOSITION TO ANTI-SLAPP MOTZON)

Case 2:13-cv-07805-DDP-JCG Document 39 Filed 01/23/14 Page 58 of 86 Page ID #:363
.?:

....
;W,

.,\. .

139

I
I
j

140

PlAMN'f~FFS OIl'lPOSrnON 10 fi-UVOLOUS SPIECIAL MOTION 10 STRIKE
(CpPOSmTIONl T~ ANTi-StAPP MO"ll'~ON)
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141
142

"**Please note that Yelp! in the url

line calls them "lIDdie§l~' but in the picture calls them "hot shorts"

PQ./.\SNTmIFFS OIfPPOSSTIION TO FtiUVOLOUS $PiECIAL MOTION
(OPPOSITION 1'0 ANT~-StAPP MOTION)

i@

STl!UKE
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144

'As Witkin states in his text, "[a] common count is proper whenever

145

the plaintiff claims a sum of money due, either as an indebtedness in

146

a sum certain, or for the

147

furnished. It makes no difference in such a case that the proof shows

148

the original transaction to be an express contract, a contract implied in

149

fact, or a quasi-contract." , A claim for money had and received can be

150

based upon money paid by mistake, money paid pursuant to a void

151

contract, or a performance by one party of an express contract." (Utility

152

Audit Co" Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 112 Cal.AppAth 950, 958 [5

153

CaLRptr.3d 520], internal citations omitted.)

154

rea~(mab!e

value of

~ervices,

goods, etc.,

Yelp! attelnpts to bring an . !\NTI
.
SLAPP nlotion as a sort of sUlnmary

155

judgment motion with no evidence by the moving party. But it cannot meet

156

the preliminary requirements of the statute. Yelp! can't obtain a motion to

157

strike on an alleged ANTI STR..t\..TEGIC IAvVSUIT AGAINST PUBLIC

158

PARTICIPATION because Yelp 1 is being brought to the bar of justice for

159

breach of contract and quasi-contract causes of action Quantum Meruit and

160

Unjust Enrichment.

161

162

On 11ay 7, 2009 - The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's order dismissing the case. The appellate court determined that

PLABNTIFFS OPPOSITION TO fRBVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
(OPPOSITION TO ANYG-SI.A.PlP MOTION)
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163

plaintiffs case could proceed to trial because plaintiffs allegations nlight

~,

support a claim for contract-like promissory estoppel and held that the

165

Communications Decency Act § 230 would not preempt the contract

166

related claims Barnes v. Yahoo! 570 F. 3d 109~

ht.tp: /ltinyurl.com/lp4izr6 case text
168

insofar as Barnes alleges a breach Qfcontract claim under
the theory qfp1"omissoryesiopi~el,subsection 230(c)(1) a/the

170

Act does not preclude h.cl"cau.seof action.. (Op. at 5335)

171

As we indicated above, Barnes' complaint could also be read to base

172

liability on section 90 of the Restatel1'lent (Second) of Contracts,
Q

173

which describes a theory of recovery often known as promissory

174

estoppel. ....

175

Such, then, is the promise that promissory estoppel requires: one that the

176

promissor intends, actu.ally or constructively, to induce reliance

177

on the part of the promisee. From such intention courts infer the

178

intention that the promise be legally enforceable. Thus, when A

179

sues B for breach of eontract, A is alleging that B violated an obligation that

180

B intended to be legally enforceable. In promissory estoppel cases, courts

PLAINTifFS OPPOSITION TO FRaVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
(OPPOSITION YO ANTI-SLAPP MOTDON)
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181

silnply infer that intention not from. consideration but from a promise that

182

B could have foreseen would induce A's reliance.

183

B Against this background, 'we inquire "\.vhether Barnes'

184

theory of recovery under [quasi contract] promissory

185

estoppel would treat Yahoo as a "publisher or speaker"

186

under the Act.

187

As we explained above, subsection 230(c)(1) precludes liability when

188

the duty the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derives from the

189

defendant's status or conduct as a publisher or speaker. In a

190

promissory estoppel case, as in any other contract case, the

191

5luty the defendant alle...~edly ~i.ob.Jed springs from

192

~ontract-

193

contractual conduct or capacity of the defendante See GTE

194

CorpG, 347 F .. ad at 662 ('9Maybe [the] lllaintiffs would have a

195

better arg\unent tha-[5 l;'-1:I its cOin.:tr'ucis

196

assumed a duty to protect them 91). Barnes does not seek to

197

hold Y M.OO liable as a publisher or speaker of third-party

198

content~

199

nromisor ,\Tho has brea~hed.

~

an enforceable promise--not from. any non ..

000,

[the defendant]

0

but rather as the coupter:narty to a contract, as a

PLAINTIFFS OPPOSJTION TO FRgVOLOUS SPIECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
(OPPOSITION TO ANTII-SLAPP MOTION)
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200
201

Prolnising is different {from publishing type actions}

202

because it is not synonym.GUS with tbe performance of the

203

action promised. That is; whereas one cannot undertake to do

204 .

something without simultaneously doing it, one can, and often

205

does, promise to do something 'without actu.ally doing it at

206

the same 'tune. Contract liability here would COlne not frOln Yahoo's

207

ll,ublishing conduct. but from Yahoo's Inanifest intention to be legally

208

obligated to do something, ...... Contract law treats the outwardly

209

111anifested intention to create an expectation on the part of another

210

as a legally significant event. That event generates a legal duty distinct

211

from the conduct at hand, be it the conduct of a Pllblisher, of a doctor,

212

or of an overzealous uncle. oo

213

footnote 14

214

Though pronlissory estoppel lurks on the sometirnes blurry boundary

215

between contract and tort, its promissory character

216

distinguishes it from torte That character drives our

217

analysis here andplacf!:!!J1rontissoMI estowe1.beyond the

218

reach qfsubsection 230(c)(11

All the same, 'we believe the distinction we draw is sound.

219

PLAINTIFfS OPPOSITION TO FRfiVOLOUS $PEC!AL MOTION TO STRU{E
(OPPOS&TU)N TO ANTa-SLAPP lMOTmON)
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220

Barn~s

221

Therefore, we conclude that, in.sofar as

alleges a breach

222

of contract clahn under the theory of promissory estoppel,

223

subsection 230(c)(1) of the Act does n~eclude her cause

224

of action~, {Emphasis added}

225

The 9 th Circuit repeatedly recognizes

226

A cause of action for unjust enrichment

227

Earlier, we recognized that a clairn for unjust enrichment is

228

essentially equivalent to a claim of copyright infringement and is

229

therefore preempted. See Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gard-er,

230

Inc.,

231

other grounds by Fogerty v,. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994).

820

F . 2d 973, 977 (9th eire 1987), overruled on

232

233
234
235

237

Montez v. Pilgrim Films & Television 08-56954 9th eire
See also First Nationwide Savings v. Per!")

2011

1.1 Cal.ApP.4th

1657 for

cause of action of Unjust Enrichlnent.

Tasini v. AOL 851 F.Supp 2d 734

Is not a Fail" Labor Standards 'Vage Case
PLAINTifFS OPPOSITION TO FRIVOLOUS SPIECIAL MOl'lON TO STRII(E
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239

But investors who allegedly paid their share in product

240

demanded a percentage ownership of I-Iuffington Post

241

The trial court in Platt v. Fox Searchlight is analogous to this case, There,

242

the laborers provided the services and the Court ordered the movie

243

compa.ny to pay in wages and not just in bling, swag, attendance at Wrap

244

Parties and prestige2 • In Tasini, the plaintiff did not seek his wages or their

245

equitable equivalant but under equity, he denland a piece of the company.

246

Tasini complaint para. 99 "...,at least $105 minion in the Merger

247

Consideration recognized by [defendants) is due to the value created

248

by the content provided by Plaintiff and the Classes and the value

249

created by Plaintiff and the classes ...

250

prayer at c. damages equal to the benefit bestowed on the

251

Defendants ... not less than $105,000,000"

252

http://tinyurl.comLma.gwfym

if

253

Tasini pled t.hat he labored for 1050 hours for Huffington Post and

254

denlanded $105 Inillion, thus he was either oem.anding $100,000 an article

2

Yelp stands alone in American Industry in issuing Yelp panties to its

workforce (see below).
PI!.AIINTRFFS Of'POSITHO~ 1'0 FfUVOLOUS $PECtiAL MOTION TO STRIKE
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255

or he was demanding his share of the enterprise as a founding member. He

256

must have been demanding his piece of the company as quantum merit

257

requires a reasonable demand and. no writer gets paid $105,000,000 for

258

1050 hours of labor.

259

minimum wage, he would have won the case as did Glatt v. Fox

260

Searchlight.. But he asked for about l/3 (lfthe entire cOlnpany as a part

261

m;mer! Therefore, Tasini 2012 is distinguished and GIattt v. Fox

262

Searchlight 2013 should be this Court's guide.

If Tasini had merely sued for 1050 hours work at

263

Plaintiffs are all "Writers for Yelp

264

And unlike Wa!-IVlartv Dukes

265

Do not have separate supervisors

266

At separate st<noes ,\Th.o have discriminated

267

In separate 'ways

268

Defendant is confused again. WalIVlart does not apply.

269

Since the Supreme Court's decision "vas rendered, the majority of

270

courts that have addressed Dukes' application to 216(b) collective

271

actions have held that Dukes does not apply to 216(b) collection

272

actions. In CreelYI v. HeR ManorCare, the court considered the
PLAINTIFfS OfJlPOSBTiON TO FlrUVOLOUS $PECtiAL MOTION TO STRIKE
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273

hnpact of Dukes on the FLSA action pending before it and concluded

274

that it did not apply. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77170, *3, 6 (N.D. Oh.

275

.July 1, 2011). In so doing~ the court reasoned. that the Dukes decision

276

turned on Rule 23(a)(2)'s "conlll1onaJ.it")I''' requirement, however,

277

under Sixth Circuit law, Rule 23(a)(2)'s "commonality" requirement
is distinct fro In the FLSA's "similarly situated" requirement as the

279

Sixth Circuit has "expressly declin[edJ to apply Rule 23's standard to

280

FLSA claims." Id. at 7:"4 citing O'Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., 575

281

F.3d at 584. In the Sixth Circuit,

282

FLSA collective action plaintiffs have been deemed similarly situated where

283

"their clairns were unified by eOn1111On theories of defendants' statutory

'I'

'!
~

284

violations," even though "proof of a violation as to one particular plaintiff

285

[did] not [necessarily] prove that the defendant violated any other

286

plaintiffs rights." Id. citing O'Brien at 585. Furthermore, the Creely court

287

determined that Dukes' gender-based Title VII claims were fundamentally

288

distinct" from the FLSA claims before it since the FLSA claims before it
~.

"[did] not require an examination of the subjective intent behind millions

I

289

I,

290

of individual employrnent decisions," rather, :'the crux of [FLSA] case [was]

291

whether the company-wide policies~ as inlplemented, violated [p]laintiff.s'

i
_J

I

fJ

1

292

statutory rights." The court in Sliger et al. v. Prospect Mortgage, LLC et al.

.11

r-.....
M'
Q)

b£)

C1l

0...
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293

also refused to extend Dukes' Rule 23 analysis to FLSA collective action

294

certification determinations, rejecting the defendant's argument that Rule

295

23's commonality standard and the "similarly situated" standard of 216(b)
.()

296

are "entirely consistent." 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94648, * 7-8, n. 25 (E.D.

297

Cal. Aug. 24, 2011).

298

Rather, after citing a string of cases holding that Rule 23 class action

299

standards are distinct from 216(b) collectiv~ action standards, the court

300

declined defendant's invitation to apply DukeS to the FLSA collective action

301

certification analysis as doing so would be "inconsistent with the Ninth

302

Circuit's apparent view that :the Rule 23 standards should not be

303

used." Id at *4-5.

304

CERTIFICATION - 2l6(b) COLLECTIVE ACTIONS v . RULE 23 ClASS
ACTIONS & ENTERPRISE COVERAGE UNDER THE FLSA Wage & Hour
Boot Camp ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law 11.2-5.11

305

306

f

,

30 7

308
309

311

Yelp's Control and Right to Control Plaintiff VvTiters
YELP'S AT TIMES CULT UKE CONTROL OF PLAU'llTMFfS THROUGH

Il.IQUOR AND DEMANDS Of MORE LABOR FROM PLAINTIFFS.

312
$.
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313

314
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315
316

"undies" is in the URL

I
-1

I
o

I

N

Cl)

317

b.O

t\1

I
I
I

I

P...
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318

o).c*Please note that Yelp! in the urlline calls them "undies" but in the

319

picture calls them "hot shorts"

320

321
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322
323

Attached exhibits (slap pictures in Opposing an anti SLAPP motion

:324

and pillow fight with Yelp executive, caption "make me Yelp";

325

Yelp!'s logois proudly called a "Yelp'!ga§m~). Demanding more

326

labor; Yelp! instructs its -writers, "Sounds like you need to get to

327

writing some reviews there cowbo)!."
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328
329

Social pressure on the free writers to ad.here to the social pressure

330

from Yelp! and its gatherings with free liquor 'G u.for our first big

331

holiday party. Ok my

gosh~

you

weren~t

there? It was like

....'..,.. "..;. ~i1~Jllfi~; ....' •. . . .
COUSIIJ trunks that
. ....... '.'
player, ;YQtNe\ftriting about that" .' '. "
Totally, These suckers wer~ han~d .
out at our HCit Summer Nights part)4.

333
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334

"That's totally going in my review" Criminal Intimidation

335

rrlessage sent froin Yelp!, through its non-wage paid labor to the

336

merchant to either give free food, pay cash to the reviewer, buy

337

protection/advertising or face a scathing business destroying review.

338

Yelp! encourages its free laborers to criminally threaten merchants

339

and gives this Court documentary evidence of its extortion tactics.

340
341
342

PROCEDURAL AND NOT SUBS,.ANTIVE

The Chief and another justice on the Ninth Circuit have indicated that
couli should revisit its prior decisions on \vhether the California antiSLAPP act applies in federal court. The majority of 9th Circuit justices,

discussing rigorous requirements of class actions but not the permissive
requirements of collective actions specifically found in and distinguished in

the Fair Labor Standards A.ct and denied an en bane hearing.
The guiding statements came earlier in Makaeftv. Trump. Univ. (11-55016

9th Cir 20131 httP.=/ltinyurtconl/khbztba In that lawsuit, Makaeff
brought a class action (not a ~on~ctive action) against Trump University,

alleging that it engaged in deceptive business practices.
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353

According to' Chief Ju.dge Kozinski:

354

The anti-SLAPP statute creates no substantive rights; it merely provides a

355

procedural mechanism for vindicating existing rights. The language of the

356

statute is procedural:. Its Inainspring is a "special motion to strike"; it

357

contains provisions limiting discovery; it provides for sanctions for parties

358

who bring a non-meritorious suit or nlotion; the court's ruling on the

359

potential success of plaintiffs claim is 110t "admissible in evidence at any

360

later stage of the case"; and an order granting or denying t.l].e speciai lTIotion

361

is inlmediately appealable.

362

Because state rules of procedure have no effect in federal court, according

363

to Chief Judge Kozinski, "this is the beginning and the end of the analysis,

364

"[t]he California anti-StAPP statute ellis an ugly gash through

365

this orderly p:rocess'~ Judge Paez wrote "I agree that California anti-

366

SLAPP statute is 'quintessentially procedural' and its application in federal

367

court has created a hybrid m.ess that now rese~mbles neither the Federal

368

Rules nor the original state statute))

370
371

372

Daniel A. Bernath, attorney for plaintiffs 01.10.2014
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO FRIVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
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From: Daniel A. Bernath, Lawyer
To "aschur@yelp.commg@casp.net
1.t.14 at 9:53 AM
To Mark Goldowitz,
Paul Clifford,
Shanti Michaels
Evan Mascagni
Aaron Shur,
This lettel' is a demand that you withdraw your frivolous Anti Slapp motion to strike a common

count.
Common count, also known as quantum meruit, is based in contract.
•

"To recover on a claim for the reasonable value of services under a quantum meruit
theory, a plaintiff must establish both that: he or she was acting pursuant to either an
express or implied request for services from the defendant and that the services
rendered were intended to and. did benefit the defendane~ (Ochs v. PacifiCare of
California (2004) 115 Cal.A.pp.4th 782, 794 [9 Cal.Rptr.3d 734], internal citation omitted.)

•

" 'As Witkin states in his teXt, "[a] common count is proper whenever the plaintiff
claims a sum of money due, either as an indebtedness in a sum certain, or for the
reasonable value of services, goods, etc., furnished. It makes no difference in such a case
that the proof shows the original transaction to be an express contract, a contract implied
in fact, or a quasi-contract." , A claim for money had and re.ceived can be based upon
money paid by mistake, money paid pursuant to a void contract, or a performance by one
party of an express contract." (Utility Audit Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 112
Cal.AppAth 950," 958 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 520], internal citations omitted.)

You are well aware of the case Barnes v. Yahoo where the 9th Circuit Court has at least three times
stated that contract based causes of action are not reachable by anti slapp motions.
Therefore, I shall point out to the Court your frivolous motion, which intentionally ignores Barnes
v. Yahoo and your "special motion to strike" which you have used to bypass the well established rule
that a demurrer must not include addition evidence outside of the. complaint. You have, for
exatnple, put in a so called Rules for Elites that you drafted well after my clients had performed their
as yet unpaid labors for you.
I send you this letter to meet and confer with you to urge you to withdraw your frivolous motion to
strike.

Daniel A. Bernath, Lawyer

Case3:1.1-cv-01S03-EMC Document32 Filed04/27/12 Pagel of 27

Case 2:13-cv-07805-DDP-JCG Document 39 Filed 01/23/14 Page 77 of 86 Page ID #:382

1

2

3

4

5

peter Rukiu (SBN 178336)
RUKIN HYLA!\Tl) DORIA & TINDALL LLP
100 Pine Street, Suite 2150

p San Francisco, CA 94111
·1' Telephone: (415) 421-1800
I Facsimile: (415) 421-1700

I

Vigil-Gallenberg (SBN 251872)
I Rosa
GALLENBERG PC

6

9701 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 1000
Beverly Hills, CA 90071
Telephone: (310) 295-1654
Facsi.mile: (310) 733-5654
Email: rosa@gallcnberglaw.coll1

7
8
9

Ian J\,1cLoughlin (pro hac vice appiication to be filed)
Tom UmlY (pro iliac vice application to be filed)

10

SHAPIRO H.ABER & URMY LLP
53 State Street 13th Floor
Boston, IvIA 02109
Telephone: (617) 439-3939
Fc'lcsimile: (617) 439-0134
E-mail: theyman@shulaw.com

11

12
13
14

15
16

E-mail: petell.ukin@rhdtlaw.com

II Attomeys for Representative Plaintiffs
II

I

tJNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTIiERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

17

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
18

JUSTIN LARKIN, ANTHONY TIJERINO, and

19

20

21
22
1

I

23

j

24

I

25

I

26

I

27

I

I

I AHMAD DEANES, on behalf ofthemseIves and

I an others simi.larl:y situated,

I
II

I

Plaintiffs,

PLAINT!FFS' NOTICE OF MOTION
A.~D

MEMORANDUM 01? POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION f'OR PRELIMINARY

v.

APPROVAL OF CLASS AND

COLLECTIVE ACTION SETTLEMENT
YELP! INC.,
Date: June L 2012
Defendant.

28

I

Case No. 3:11-cv-01503-EMC

PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION ISO. PRELIMINA..l~Y APPROVAL

Time: 1:30 p.m.
Com1room: 5 _17 th Floor
Judge: HOll. Edward M. Chen

I
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I
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I.

1

INTRODUCTION

2

'I

3

I se'ek preliminalY approval of this proposed class and collective action settlement Plaintiffs entered

4

on behalf ofthemse1ves and the proposed Class of Account Executives employed by Yelp! Inc.

5

'("Defendant or "Yelp"), which will provide for a maximum settlement payment of$1,250,000 in

6

retml1 :for a release and dismissal with prejudice of the claims asserted against Yelp in this action.

7

I The net settlementfhnd will be disuibuted to Participating Class Members based on the number of

8

II work weeks

9

I

Plaintiffs Justin Larkin, Anthony Tij.;,rino, and Ahmad Deanes (hereinafter "Plaintiffs")

Clas~i Membel'~ w<)rl~ed

dmi.ng the relevant class period.

Plaintiffs mId Class Members worked as Account Executives for Yelp. During the relevant

10

dass period, Yelp cla.ssified Account Executives as exempt from the overtime requirements of

II

federal and state law and paid them at a straight-time rate of pay rather than an ovel1ime rate of pay

12

for the overtime hours that they worked. Plaintiffs challenged this pay practice 011 the groilllds that

13
14

15

,I Yelp's classific.afion ofits Account Executi.ves as exempt Vi'as unlawfhl because these employees
II
r did not faU iuto the commissioniinstde sales ex.emptioll, the administrative exemption, or allY other

I knovVll exemption.

The proposed Settlement is fair and reasonable in Ii?)'!t of the risks Plaintiffs and Class

16

Members faced ill connection with the class certification, liability, and damages phases of this case

17
18

I and the value of the claims should Plaintiffs prevail. Plaintiffs contend that Yelp cannot seriously

19

II dispute the alleged misdassification of ACcOlmt Ex.a-cutives, which lies at the heart of this case, as

20

there is no colorable exemption defense. However, Plaintiffs face several potential procedural

21

hurdles. Specifically, Yelp contends that ovcltime claim releases signed by some putative cla~.s

22

members in March. 2011, a class action prohibition policy promUlgated by Yelp in Feblllary 2011

23

signed by a m?Jority of Class Members, and severance agreement releases signed by fCImer

24

employees (including the tvvo California-based named Plaintiffs) will bar the participation of the

25

vast majority of potential class memb{;rs. A detennination thatthe releases and/or the class action

26

waiver are vpJid would significantly nan'ow fue scope of the case and/or present a potential barrier

27

to recovery for many Class Members.

28

II
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To avoid that risk, Plaiutitls' counsel have negotiated a Settlement that creates a maximlUl1
2

3

settlement ffillount of$I,250,000. Pbintiffs' counsel believe that this Settlement-·negotiated

II

I extensivelv and at ann's length '''ljth the assistance of an eXI)erienced mediator--is a fair and

i "

_.

-4

! reasonable resolution of the claims against Yelp in jigllt of the risks Plaintiffs face if this matter

5

'I proceeds to trial. Accordingly, Plainti11s respectfhIly request ('hat this Court: (1) grant preliminary

6

, approval of the proposed settlement; (2) conditionally certify for settlement purposes a National

7

I

8

II the fonn, content, and method of distribution of the Notices ,md Proof of Claim fOlUlS; (5) appoint

9

II Simpluris, Inc. ("Silnpluris'), as the Claims Admiulstrator pursnallt to the Settlement Agreement;

10

(6) appoint Ru.kin Hyland Doria & Tindall LLP, Gallenberg PC, and Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP

Settlement Class; (3) conditionally certify a Califcmlia Class for settlement purposes; (4) approve

11

. as settlement Class Counsel~ and (7) schedule a hearing regarding final approval of the proposed

12

settlement ffild Class Cotmse!'s request for attomey's fees, costs, and incentive award payments.

13

I

14

15
16

17
18

,I

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.

Factual Background and the Parties' Contentious

Yelp is a San Fnmcisco·"based company t:vhich operates a social networking a11.1 user

I

I
I

review website. Yelp generates revenue through the sale of advertising and uses inside sales

personnel, called "Account Executives," to secure its advertising business. Account Executives
work under different titles, depending on their experience and seniority: account executive trainee,

19

jttnior account .executive, acc(mnt executive, or senior aCC(Hmt executive. Regardlesf. of title, a11

20

Account Executives have the same core responsibility 1:0 sell Yelp'S advmtising products.

21

22

23
24

!

From the begimling of its operations until approximately March 2011, Yelp classified its

I~CCOl.~t Executives ~s ~xempt

from f~deral and st~te OVe~il11.e.laws .. Yel p paid all Account

.

I Executives under a s1l11llar compensatIon plan durmg the lIabIlIty penod. Although some detalls
! varied, all ACCOlUlt Executives received a base salary and Iud the ability to earn additional
I eompensation or to move to a higher leVel of compensation bas(~d on pedonnan.ca.
Each ofthe Ptaintiff.') INorked for Yelp as an Account Executive. Docket NiUnber ("Dkt

26

No. ") 4, at ~. 9-11. Plaintiff Lat'kin worked in Yelp'S San Francisco office fro111 September 2008 to

27

28

I

II

III.

2
PLAINTlHS' MFA ISO .PRELIMiNAR.Y APPROVAL

Case No. 3:11"t'l'·01503·EMC

'.f

II

Ii
Ca.se3:11-cv-01503
EMC Document32
F!led04/27/12
Case 2:13-cv-07805-DDP-JCG
Document
39 Filed 01/23/14
PagePage9
80 of of
8627 Page ID #:385
ft

l\.·hU'Ch 2009 and Plaintif~Tijerino worked in the San Francisco office fi·OlU Febru<:lty 2010 through

1
2

I1 November 2010. ld. at 119-10. PlaintiffDeanes worked out of Yelp's Scottsdale, Arizona office

3

III

4

I!

5

I' and that, on the basis ofthis exempt classification, v:{eJp did not pay

6

II'om October 2010 to January 20U. ld. ar 4! 11.

Plaintif£." cOlltend that Yelp misc1assitled its Account Executives as exempt fi'om overtime,

II

I

A':;:COlmt

Executives the

overtimCl wages required uuder the FLSA or Califomia law.
Yelp contends that Plaintiffs' claims have no merit. Yelp asserts that the majority of class

7

, members, including hvo oftlle named Plaintiffs, have signed releases that preven.t them from
9

10
11

II' bringing the claims asserted in this la:wsuit. Yelp also claims that many class menlbers have agreed

I

to pursue any claims that tIley may have individually rather than on a class or collective action
basis, effectively precluding them fi-om pru:ticipating in tins action.

12

B.

13

On March 29,201 i, PlaintiffJustin Larkin filed this action ill the United States District

Procedural History

14

15
damages, and restitution. Dkt. No. 1.

16
17

On April 18, 2011, Plaintiff Justin Larkin provided notice to the Califomia Labor and

18

Workforce Development Agency and Yelp in accordance v.,ith the procedures set forth in the

19

Califomia Labor Code's Private Attomeys General Act, Labor Code § 2698 ct. seq. (PAGA) of111e

20
On April 19, 2011, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding two additional plaintiffs,

21
22

Anthony Tijerino and Ahmad Deanes. Dkt. No.4.

23

On May 11, 201], the patties executed an agreement tolling the FLSA statute of limitation

24

for all potential collective action members effective May 11,2011. Declaration of Peter Rukill In

25

Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class and Collective Action Settlement

26

I

27

'I proceedings pending mediation and pernlitting the filing of a second amended complaint adding a

28

I

("Rukin Decl.") ~ 7. On May 20, 2012, the parties executed a stipulation requesting a stay oft110

3
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DANIEL A. BERNATH, SEN 116636
ussyorktowncvsl0@yahoo.com
10335 sw Hoodview Drive
Tigard 0 R 97224
503.36704 2 04

FILED

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

.'72014
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BY
DEPUTY

6
7

8
9
10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

11

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

12

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Dr. Allen Panzer,
)
i\my Sayers,
)
Lily Jeung a:n.d
)
Darren 'Valchesk~, on behalf of
)
themselves and all others similarly)

situated,

)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

)

vs.

23

24

Yelp, hie.

25
26

Defendant.

27

Declaration of Daniel A. Bernath
in opposition to frivolous anti SLAPP
for wages
RECEIVED SUT NOT FILED
CLEBK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

)

21

22

CV13-070805-DDP-JCG

.c;

~ I 7 201.4

___

) Febuary 10, 2014
:::rb.~_.,,
~
) 10:00 a.ill.
CENTAALDiSTR~rCAL1~ir:.··
) Counll.'OOUU 3, 2 nd Floo y
...~~-~,
.J
l Hon. Judge Dean D. Pregersoll
'0."' __

)

I have examined the public display by defendant Yelp, Inc., located on a server, and

28

connected on my computer in Tigard Oregon to their computer.

29

1.

30

attorney, that I was filing a lawsuit against Yelp on behalf of Elites. Thereafter, Yelp,

31

Inc. then published a document entitled TOS for Elites. However, a search of Yelp. com

32

in the archive of the internet, found at wvv'1v.archive.org and VlTwvv.waybackrnachine.org

There was no "Terms of Service for Elites" until I informed Anthony Mcnamer, Yelp's
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33

shows that this so caned document did not exist ip. the relevant time period of plaintiffs'

34

labors for Yelp.

35
36

Therefore, Yelp) Inc. produced this so called document just to be read by this

37

.~and for tb.i~

38

must be disregarded.

39

2.

40

working for Yelp in 2009 or earlier and the manufactured evidence of a 2013 or 2014

41

"Terms of Service", purporting to be an agreement, should be disregarded as more

42

"evidence" produced by defendant Yelp, Inc. for this judge to read, in this lawsuit and

43

for these motions. (Yelp wrist band, beer bottle opener, pill container)

I

~

44
45

Inotion and is not relevant and as it is manufactured evidence,

Yelp also produces a so called Terms of Service. However, it appears Plaintiffs began

~,
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47

I have examined the defendant's publishing and have found that they demand that their

o
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48

non wage paid employees write more and more reviews or suffer social ostracism .

•

• • ,' ••••••

':

:~.h.hh.h~

•

' ' ' ' " .. """",,-

••• v y • •

*.
h

"<

, .... ,~~~

Y"'W'~'A

Limlted Edition Yelp Erlte Te~~
Yelp
Burs.·.:t··. s·.·.~·.··.·.·rt:.·
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~~::I~~~"'::~ Ef~e E

l1Jmi.'f;'(j f::)fCi(/s{I.t'el,'<
if){ 'l'pln
J::.'1if oe,.
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. -,.. .. !·ii' tA_.Ix(.r;:
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e. 'n.·, !:.,
l'..'lIp

ies been caUed a fl'ow€w, a windmill a
yeJpgas01, but la·s·the BlATs! Jt'SSDrt
of~he abstract embo.diment ofwnat
wntlog' a Yelp review is;, part
exclamation pornt, pal1 pop, the 8uf'st
mak.es Yelp '~vh~t it

Not EJite?
T(Hj~h cookie Sounds flke "IOU net:d
h') get ~o vvrmrl9 S1)me feV!e'~!i/s theH~,
G0'.vboy
.
IS.

Tt):;!U'~ To,tally G'Oiflg in I'ny Review Shirt :,.",~~, ')
49

C'a~o~I' LrKe, )1t;)U .kn(lW 'y'oll~it~ tQtanv

50

Yelp admissions on its website :wvvV\7.yelp.com Yelp!'s logo is proudly

51

called a "Yelp!gasnl~'.Den1anding more labor, Yelp! instructs its

52

writers, "Sounds like you need to get to writing some reviews

53

there cowboy. " (Free T Shirt to Elite writers stating that if they don't attend

M

ill.

b.O

rn

0..'
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54

.e

business meetings/parties that they are "so lame.")

~. for our Eltte Events,

'4.,,:

'Q

I.,.

$anFrancJsco Shirt.·. 25;,1'; f'iiri,'·:r4A.·d·

t,

."t.t...:. ~·_·4:.;!,rv·

Where do you Yelp? You Yetp San

Fmncisco"dan't you? elmon, Sure
¥~u do. SF is where we started and

continue to. gCl s.trmlil-Thfs shirt was

p(l~ted fna limited run for aur first big
.ho'hday party. On rny gosh~ ,you

weren' tnere?lt was 6.t1Jy Uke the
coolest freaking party on thepfanet
Yottre so larne..
.

S:arShir1

,",

"'...

"
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~ ..

55

56

Requests by defendant to provide more services and attend its business meetings

57

and '''lear and identify as defendant's agents and/or employees. Business meeting

58

with free liquor ~' .•.for our first big holiday party. Oh my gosh, you

59

weren't there? It was like the coolest frealdng party on the planet.

60

You're so lame. "

61

. Free T Shirt to terrorize businessmen, "This is sooo going into my Yelp Review!" or

62

words to that effect.

63

4. I have examined the defendant's publishing and found the free or below cost

64

uniforms that defendant requires Yelp non wage paid workers to wear. Yelp, Inc.

65

uniform includes Yelp "undies" and tank top and photographs blatantly promising
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66

Charles Manson-like sadomasochism, homosexual and heterosexual adventures as one

67

of the Yelp, Inc., non wage paid laborers.

68

Th~~t's

i

II

Totally Going in my Review Shirt

C'mon. Like, you know you've totally said this
while waiting in line at that french place that
thinks that it scooler than it is where your
friend's cousin thinks thai' bartender is a total player. You're
writing about that. Totally. These suckers were handed out
at our Hot Summer' Nights party.
I

74

75
76

I

.
AI

